(1st Infantry Division) in the Attack on the Hürtgen Forest
16 November - 5 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Major Maurice A. Belisle
THE GENERAL SITUATION
Within its zone of advance the First Amy had formidable obstacles. Due east of AACHEN were the main defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE beyond which was flat to rolling terrain dotted with towns, each a fortress. Tied in with these defenses to the south was the HURTGEN FOREST area, a rolling to rugged, heavily forested area forming a triangle AACHEN - DÜREN - MONSCHAU efficiently strengthened with pillboxes, mines, and wire.
During the first days of November there was evidence of a strong enemy build-up on the front of the U.S. First and Ninth Armies. (As late as 25 November 1944 the First Army had identified twelve German divisions on its front with an estimated strength of 65,000 to 70,000 men.) (7) It was apparent that an attack by the First Army, particularly with VII Corps, could be successful only if our forces were strengthened.
VII Corps at this time was composed of the 1st Infantry Division in the AACHEN area, the 3d Armored Division in the STOLBERG area, and the 47th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division to the south of the Corps zone. Three additional infantry divisions were subsequently assigned to reinforce the First Army, the 4th Infantry, the 99th and the 104th. The 99th was assigned to V Corps in the EIFEL FOREST area while the 4th and 104th plus the 4th Cavalry Group and CCR of the 5th Armored Division were assigned to VII Corps for the drive. (8) Preliminary to the attack by the First and Ninth Armies in the ROER RIVER offensive a gigantic air demonstration was scheduled to soften up the front where the main attack was to take place. As planned and executed "Operation Q was the largest scale close support effort ever flown by the Allied Air Forces." Approximately 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped on fortified positions in cities and areas in front of the First and Ninth Armies. (9)
The VII Corps contemplated the use of the 104th Division on the left, the 1st Division in the center, and the 4th Division on the right attacking generally northeast with the objectives of seizing crossings of the ROER RIVER, prepared to continue the advance to the east on Corps order. (10) The 3d Armored Division was assigned a limited objective attack "echeloned slightly in time" behind the attack of the 1st Division to seize the HASTENRATH area. The 1st Division zone would then expand, squeezing out the 3d Armored Division. The 104th Division sector, wide at the outset, narrowed down considerably upon the division's eastward progress until finally the 104th would be squeezed out by the northeasterly movement of the 1st Division.
Prior to the 1st Division's relief by the 104th Division in the AACHEN area the division commander, General Huebner, briefed his regimental commanders on the impending operation. Shortly general areas were assigned to the regiment in wooded areas southwest of SCHEVENHÜTTE for assembly upon relief by the 104th Division. The schedule of events allowed little time to be spent in assembly areas — relief was effected on the nights of 8 - 9 November, while the ROER drive was scheduled to begin 11 November. (11 )
The terrain in the new area differed from that in the AACHEN area immensely. The 1st Division's right flank was entirely forested, fairly rugged, and practically without trafficable roads. There was only one unimproved road, not much more than a trail, running northeast in the woods. The left portion was rolling to fairly rugged, dotted with small towns and wooded areas with a fair road net. Throughout the area vehicles were roadbound except where engineer work reinforced trails by corduroying. (12)
To the front the major enemy units identified in the zone of the division's advance were the 12th and 47th Volksgrenadier Divisions, the 12th on the north and the 47th on the south. Neither of these divisions was thought to be the best in the German Army. They had been pummeled, chastized and declared ineffective in the not too distant past. Somehow we were to learn that they had been rejuvenated. (13)
Morale in the 1st Division was excellent. From the beaches of NORMANDY the division rolled along with the First Army through FRANCE, BELGIUM, and the SIEGFRIED defenses outside AACHEN and had recently effected the surrender of that famous German city.
Casualties had been fairly heavy and although some replacements had been received, units were still somewhat short of T/o strength.
It was anticipated that close logistical support might be a problem, particularly in the right sector, because of the lack of all weather roads in the area.
The division plan of attack called for the 16th and 26th Infantry Regiments to attack simultaneously at H-Hour. The 18th Infantry was to be in reserve. The 47th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division was attached to the 1st Division and was to hold its present positions initially.
The 16th Infantry attacking on the left was to seize its first objective HAMICH, protect the left flank of the division, and maintain contact with the 3d Armored Division on the left and the 26th Infantry on the right. The 26th Infantry attacking on the right was to seize and hold its first objective, protect the right flank of the division, and maintain contact with the 4th Division on the right and the 16th Infantry on the left. Radio silence was in effect until 1030 hours D-Day, H-Hour and D-Day were to be announced. (13)
Division artillery was to remain silent until 1030 hours on D-Day and was not to open fire until the scheduled preparation for the attack. (15)
