12th Infantry Regiment (4th Inf. Div.)
West of Gey
By Captain Frederic N. Oettinger Jr.
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
In attempting to justly weigh the overall action of Baker Company on this operation, let us first reflect on the order of the day awarded the company by the F0URTH INFANTRY DIVISION:
ORDER OF THE DAY
NUMBER........58Co, B, 12th Infantry
On 29 November 1944, Co. B, 12th Infantry, attacked and seized the high ground west of Gey, Germany. During this attack the company drove in the outpost of a strong German position. The company then stormed an entrenched German position strongly defended by machine guns and machine pistols supported by mortar fire. The company rapidly reorganized and pushed on to its objective, capturing three machine-gun nests west of Gey. After dark, the company dug in on the high ground on the edge of the woods overlooking Gey.
Considerable artillery, mortar and tank fire was placed on the position each day. On 2 December 1944, a counterattack was beaten off with heavy losses to the enemy. On 3 December 1944 a fresh German battalion made a dawn attack supported by a heavy concentration of artillery and tank fire against the position but failed to take it. On the afternoon of 3 December 1944, the constant heavy enemy fire caused numerous casualties including all of the company's officers.
During this time the company evacuated its own wounded to a forward aid station. Despite the disorganization caused by the loss of key personnel, the company still held the original ground when it was relieved on the morning of 5 December 1944.
The Division Commander desires to commend each officer and enlisted men of Co. B, 12th Infantry, for such outstanding performance of duty during a most vital action. 124
Both Regiment and Battalion felt that Baker Company had accomplished its mission. The cost, as assured in casualties, was extremely high. The individuals who went through the inferno of Hurtgen could not repeat such an experience many times. A word description of the existing conditions of terrain, weather and the enemy is most inadequate in many respects.
Due credit should be given to the individual riflemen. He was courageous in his devotion to duty. During the entire period of the operation only one soldier asked permission to go to the rear. This man was killed the same day. One other soldier was sent to the rear because of mental exhaustion. To keep this second soldier on the position would have had an extremely bad effect on the other men. An officer should be quick to recognize a combat fatigue case. This man had discarded his equipment, including his helmet. He sat on the edge of his hole shaking and staring into space. He made no attempt to get down in his hole when the Company was shelled.
The attack on 29 November took on the form of "rolling up the carpet".
The enemy expected an attack from the south and made his disposition accordingly. Actually he was flanked across his entire front. It was feasible to rotate the platoons often in this attack on 29 November.
The Company, being in column, was readily maneuvered and control was maintained. The Company sought to complete its mission and did not press the attack to the north after the first resistance withdrew to the north.
Control in woods is extremely difficult. Battalion, Companies and Platoons, when attacking, normally advanced in column. Control is the dominating factor.
When attacking, contact was seldom if ever maintained with units on the flanks. This was not a healthy situation. The sectors assigned to units and the formations of the smaller units further developed the violation of flank contact. Flank security and local protection was maintained. At the same time it was necessary to decentralize control with the weight of responsibility for the bulk of attack decisions resting with the leaders of Battalions, Companies and Platoons.
The 81 MM Mortars were used as supporting fires in the majority of supported fires. The Infantry mortars proved to be exceptionally effective in woods as the high curved trajectory of the projectile caused the round to come into the target vertically.
Baker Company used a perimeter defense when it initially occupied its objective on 29 November. All round defense is of prime importance in woods. Many times depth will be sacrificed in order to retain this protection from an attack coming from an unknown direction. Once the enemy had made his commitment it is extremely difficult for the defender to move into an alternate or supplementary position. Control of individual riflemen is a distinct problem. An intelligent enemy will probe until he has located a weak point in the defense and he will use his force against this weakness.
In the defense, active and aggressive contact was maintained with units on the flanks. Baker Company caused patrols to be sent out daily while in this defensive posit ion. However, after the enemy began hitting the position with counterattacks, the patrolling was no longer ordered.
Coffee is one of the most important items in the "K" ration. The "K" ration is inadequate in this respect as the coffee is issued only in the breakfast unit. Each unit of the "K" ration should contain at least two coffee servings. This would give the men an adequate amount of this stimulant. In addition, the Quartermaster should prepare, for issue, packages containing twenty-five coffee units.
The combat uniform, in the Hurtgen, was not satisfactory. The winter weather was cold and wet; sometimes turning to snow. The long overcoat was too bulky and cumbersome. It absorbed water and became increasingly heavy. Many men discarded the overcoat in favor of a series of jackets. A combat uniform, of the type issued by the Armored Force, consisting of a jacket end pants, should be issued to the Combat Infantryman. This uniform should contain individual stowage pockets. Stowage sections should be provided for each soldier to carry eight hand grenades.
The Commander should make use of all available means of communication. Wire and messenger were the primary means of communication. The Rifle Companies and Battalion cooperated in keeping the wire intact and operating between these two units. The laying of additional wire lines into a position will insure that contact with higher Headquarters is maintained. Wire should be marked with an identifying color at 100 yard intervals. This would give both the Commander and the Communication Personnel an indication of distance traveled. This would be especially helpful in woods or jungles.
Liaison between units as small as Rifle Companies and Tank Platoons is highly desirable. The attached unit should furnish the liaison. The Tank Platoon Sergeant performed in a superior manner and adequate coordination was effected.
Because of the difficulty of maintaining and protecting supply routes, rations were substituted for water or ammunition was sent forward in lieu of bedding rolls.
Sufficient maps should be furnished to include distribution to the Rifle Company Platoon Leaders. The supply of maps in this operation was inadequate, both as to quantity and detailed physical coverage of the terrain.
