12th Infantry Regiment (4th Inf. Div.)
West of Gey
By Captain Frederic N. Oettinger Jr.
GENERAL SITUATION
12th Army Group published Letter of instructions number Ten on the same day that Aachen fell, ordering a re-groupment of all three Armies and a November advance to the Rhine.
The crossing of the Roer river, below the dams, was not considered within the scope of a calculated risk as long as the large dams above the crossing sites remained in German hands. The only direct method to seize these dams would be to attack through the Hurtgen Forest and seize the dams. This mission was given to the First Army. 13 (See Map B)
MAP B
The First Army, commanded by General Courtney Hodges, consisting of three
Corps, the V, VII, and VIII, having cleared the Aachen area 21 October 1944,
had the mission of driving to the Roer river.
The VII Corps consisted of the 1st, 4th, and 104th Infantry Divisions, with the 3rd Armored in the tank role. 14
The 4th Infantry Division was assigned the sector in the Hurtgen Forest on the right flank of the VII Corps which was the northern Corps in line. 15 (See Map A)
On 28 November 1944, the 104th Infantry Division, to the north on the left flank of VII Corps, attacking before dawn, advanced 2,000 yards, entering the towns of Lamersdorf and Inden. The front of this Division was established on the Inde river. One bridge over this river was secured intact. 16
MAP A
The First Infantry Division, in its sector, advanced across the highway east of Langerwehe. Langerwehe was cleared by elements of the 18th Infantry Regiment and local security was placed along the stream about one half a mile northeast of Langerwehe. One battalion established itself in the edge of the woods in the vicinity of Merode and late in the afternoon was fighting in the town of Merode. 17 (See Map B)
The 3rd Armored Division remained in reserve in the vicinity of Stolberg.
In the V Corps sector to the south of the 4th Infantry Division, the action continued to the east along the southern edge of the forest south of the town of Hurtgen. 18
Elements of the German 1st SS, 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were reported to be in the area west of Cologne. Confirmed information indicated that Sixth SS Panzer Army was being placed in the reserve role to counterattack if the First Army succeeded in crossing the Roer river. 19
In addition, the Fifteenth German Army was placed in the vicinity of Koenigshoven.
The first US Army estimate of the enemy situation indicated a general build up of troop strength. 20
The enemy, during the third week in November reinforced his units in front of the First Army by bringing in the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, 47th Infantry Division and the 277th. Infantry Division. The 3rd Parachute and the 344th Infantry Divisions were added and one week later the 326th Infantry and the 352nd Infantry Divisions were placed in front of the 1st Army. 21
German units identified by the 12th Infantry Regiment, in the Hurtgen Forest included the 183rd Volksgrenadier Division, 47th Infantry Division, 353rd Infantry Division and Independent Fortress Battalions. The German organization of the Hurtgen Forest defenses was dual in nature, primary use of the natural obstacles end strengthening these obstacles by the use of all artificial obstacles at their disposal in order to strengthen their defensive positions. 22
