in the Hurtgen Forest
Germany, 2 - 14 November 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
THE ATTACK
By Major Paul A. Troup, Jr.
At 0900 hours, 2 November 1944, after an artillery preparation which lasted one hour the 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry with Company "D", 707th Tank Battalion attached crossed the line of departure and attacked through Germeter to Vossenack. At the same time the 1st division in the north half of the VII Corps sector attempted to feint the enemy into thinking the attack might be along the entire front by demonstrating with mortars, artillery, and strong patrols but no advance was made. The 2nd Battalion of the 112th Infantry met light resistance in its drive eastward; reaching the northeast section of Vossenack by early afternoon. The two attacking companies set up a defensive position on the forward slope of the ridge while the reserve company mopped up the stragglers and snipers that were by-passed. The enemy's well observed artillery fire took a heavy toll on the companies, reducing them considerably. It was already evident that the artillery was unable to effectively neutralize the enemy observation posts and positions on the commanding ridges because shells were coming into the town from three major points of the compass. The attacking elements reported enemy armor in the town of Schmidt but when this report was forwarded, G-2 promptly stated that only ten tanks were in the vicinity and they were fifty miles away. 13
2 November
As the 2nd Battalion initiated its attack, the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved into positions to the rear of the line of departure and made preparations to move to the aid of the attacking battalion should it be counterattacked. The commanders also made reconnaissances as far forward as the front line for routes of advance; thus enabling them to further refine their attack plans for the following day. 14
To the north the 109th Infantry had made good progress in their coordinated attack with the 112th Infantry and had succeeded in knocking out 15 "Pill Boxes" and in capturing over 200 prisoners. The 1st Battalion of this regiment had advanced 2700 yards in a drive to the northeast toward the town of Hurtgen but the other assault battalion attacking in the same direction could only gain 500 yards due to thick mine fields and wire obstacles that were covered by bands of grazing fire from automatic weapons. 15
On the south the 110th Infantry attacked at 1200 hours but immediately encountered heavy artillery and mortar fire along with a strong defensive position consisting of concrete "pill boxes", log bunkers, and bands of defensive wire that was covered with machine guns. Even after the area had been saturated with artillery and mortar fire, the assault battalions were unable to breach this fortified position. 16
The preponderance of artillery support on the first day of this attack can be better understood by stating that in addition to the reinforced artillery effort of V Corps the units of VII Corps on the north fired 9000 rounds and the Tank Destroyers fired 952 missions on ground targets. 17
A total of 306 prisoners were evacuated through the division Prisoner of War cage and identification of the units of these prisoners who were interrogated indicated that no new unit had been moved into this area prior to the attack. 17
At 0700 hours on the 3 November 1944 the 3rd Battalion of the 112th Infantry launched its attack across the Kall River and with practically no difficulty the town of Kommerscheidt fell to Company "K". The battalion then pushed into Schmidt and by evening the three rifle companies were in the north end of the town. Only a small section of the town had been cleared of enemy when due to darkness the mopping up teams were engaging one another in fire fights; consequently, the battalion commander ordered the companies to stop all forward movement and button up for the night. Resupply of ammunition and rations was accomplished by the use of the full tracked cargo carriers (Weasels). Lt. William George, 3rd Battalion Motor Officer, who had led the supply convoy, attempted to get the "Weasel" towed Battalion Anti-tank guns into Schmidt. When this column was traversing the Kall Valley one of the drivers made the wrong turn and the gun crew was knocked out when it ran into a German road block. 18
3 November
While the assault of Schmidt was in progress the 2nd Battalion improved their defensive positions east of Vossenack. The observed artillery fire on this position inflicted heavy casualties and cut the strength of the already depleted companies to a point where they would have to have replacements or be replaced. As reinforcements arrived they had to be fed into the line during the action. 19
In the meantime the 1st Battalion was ordered into Kommerscheidt by the Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Peterson. Their mission was to secure the town and to prepare to assist the 3rd Battalion in Schmidt should they be attacked. The Regimental Commander knew that this movement would be the only way he could plug the gap that existed between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The 1st Battalion was in the process of preparing their defensive position when "B" Company on the south edge of the town became engaged by a force of undetermined strength. 20
The division plan gave a battalion of combat engineers the mission of making the trail from Vossenack to Kommerscheidt passable to tanks and other supporting trains. This trail was nothing more than wagon tracks, narrow, with many sharp turns that made it almost unusable to anything but light vehicles and they were bogging down in the mud. This project was very slow developing, consequently only 3 tanks of the 707th Tank Battalion were able to cross the valley. 21
On the north on this date the 1st Battalion of the 109th Infantry was counterattacked by a force of approximately 200 enemy supported by 10 self-propelled gun3 and 2 tanks. The enemy attack was repulsed and the two tanks were knocked out. The battalion was then ordered to defend its present positions. 22
The 110th Infantry on the south attacked with the 3rd Battalion breaching one line of fortifications only to smash into another strong defensive line. The 1st Battalion of this regiment prepared for an envelopment of the enemy's right or north flank by moving through the zone of the 112th Infantry. 23
The supporting artillery fired every called mission throughout the day with the Tank Destroyers alone firing approximately 3000 rounds on ground indirect fire missions. 24
Weather again stymied air activity consequently only a few missions were flown but night fighter cover was given. 24
