(4 - 21 September 1944)
By General der Infanterie a.D. Friedrich August Schack, March 1948.
APPRECIATION
Our Troops
In Section 1, I described the condition and situation of the German troops when I took over command of LXXXI Corps.
During the three weeks of my command we succeeded, in spite of heavy fighting and daily recurring crises, in filling out the skeleton command to such an extent that efficient units were organized with surprising rapidity. Because of the fighting spirit of all ranks, willing to sacrifice everything in their country's defense, these units, notwithstanding their motley nature with respect to ages, equipment, battle experience, and training, showed daily improvement of morale and combat technique. Indeed, even during the most serious crises every command, from corps to battalions, worked for the improvement of personnel and materiel replacements. Everywhere the most astonishing shrewdness and organizational skill manifested itself. The results, achieved in spite of all difficulties, will always be recognized by experts as enormous.
Again and again, however, difficulties encountered made our situation appear to be past all hope. The almost unrestricted air superiority of the enemy paralyzed all our movements by day. The Rhine River bridges were so patrolled by enemy aircraft that scarcely any transports or supplies crossed unscathed, any many trains of fuel and ammunition were destroyed. Every tank that showed itself during the day was attacked immediately by from 3 to 5 fighter-bombers. Often, therefore, we did not dare to commit the few tanks or assault guns available, although the situation would have made their employment advisable. Commanders visiting their troops in small Volkswagen, to bring their personal influence to bear at critical points, could only run from one hedge to another. Even then they were either put out of action by fighter bombers or forced under cover for such long periods that they lost much valuable time and often missed decisive moments.
The superiority of enemy artillery was another disadvantage factor. This disparity was increased by the lack of ammunition which kept us from using, to the full the few guns we had remaining. Corps often had to take ammunition arbitrarily away from divisions on which enemy pressure had eased and shift it to the point of main effort.
The enemy also had tenfold superiority in tanks. Our few were employed continuously and had to be moved by night. The crews, therefore, were often completely exhausted and the tanks did not receive maintenance and service. Our few tanks - and assault - gun units disintegrated at a surprisingly rapid rate.
Lack of spare parts and the non-arrival of fuel, often at the most critical moments, bogged down our activities and time and again led to frightful crises. On 10 September, for example, when the commanding officer of the newly-subordinated 9th Panzer Division reported at Corps headquarters, he had been able to scrape up just enough fuel for his Volkswagen. Corps had to issue him more, to enable him to return to his troops. Later, when a fuel supply train had been located after hours of telephoning, and the quartermaster had driven to the train, in person, to assure the refueling of the division, the train was set afire by enemy fighter-bombers just as the gasoline and lubricant supply columns had drawn alongside. It was hours before the needed fuel could be obtained elsewhere.
The number of enemy infantry units was only a third greater than ours; but among all the units subordinated to LXXXI Corps only the 12th Division and the 183d Volks Grenadier Division, which arrived toward the end of the battle, could be called normal fully-equipped divisions. as stated earlier, every other task force was made up of motley units badly equipped, scantily armed, and often consisting of men who straggled in during combat.
The large number of fortress-, alarm-, security-, air force-, and navy battalions that arrived from time to time as replacements were organized principally from older-age groups who had only served in the communications zone and therefore had no combat experience whatever. Their armament was scanty and heterogeneous. They lacked, above all, machine guns and mortars. Moreover, the rank and file of the older-age groups were untrained in the operation of mortars. And while the storm-troopers supervising civilian field fortification workers were loafing about with new rifles, combat replacements from the zone of the interior sometimes arrived without rifles.
For the most part, the battalions organized in haste had no field kitchens, transports, or horses. Food supply and the transport of arms and ammunition during withdrawals were therefore greatly hampered. Often, ad especially after heavy casualties, very valuable equipment and armament, which could not be replaced because of the general deficiencies and supply difficulties were lost.
Replacements were entirely insufficient. They did not total a twelfth part of the casualties. Therefore efficient divisions, who had begun at war strength, lost combat effectiveness at a surprisingly rapid rate.
The troops themselves were completely worn out. For the most part the bulk of them, consisting of fragments of combat veteran divisions, had been fighting continuously since the enemy landings. They could not be allowed to rest because of the units' diminishing strength and the continuous withdrawals. Their socks and boots were in rage. Tired and forlorn, they literally dragged themselves along. Nevertheless they were ready, again and again, as far as their failing strength permitted, to heed the call of duty with eager loyalty. In spite of reverses, the fine relationship between officers and men of all grades held, in unfailing unity, during every action.
I think of my loyal and gallant officers and men with gratitude and pride. Some future time, less filled with hatred, will recognize the accomplishments of the German people in this war into which they were hurled against their will by a criminal government, after the terrible war aims of our enemy become clear.
I have not dwelt in detail upon the plans and orders of LXXXI Corps headquarters but have limited myself to describing the general course of events in outline, from memory. This is all that is possible in the light of imperfect maps and data, and after the loss of my notes and the sore trails that have overtaken me.
At the outset, LXXXI Corps' only mission was to organize some effective units and to establish contact with the adjacent forces on its right. Prevention of the encirclement of the Fifteenth Army, staggered father ahead on the north, was of vital importance. In spite of insufficient means, this mission was accomplished.
During the fighting on the Meuse River and west of the West Wall, the general idea was to gain time for preparing the antiquated and neglected West Wall for defense according to modern principles. Because of the pressure of a superior enemy and the insufficiency of our own forces, this mission was not accomplished. To make the West Wall ready for decisive defense, we would have had to hold the enemy at the Meuse for at least four weeks longer.
The final mission - to hold he West Wall - was accomplished only imperfectly, because of the inadequacy of our forces and means of combat. Even at the end of the first Battle of Aachen, the deep pocket in the Stolberg area remained.
On the other hand, we succeeded in preventing the decisive breakthrough planned by the enemy south of Aachen, aimed at the Ruhr industrial area. And in spite of all the difficulties encountered, we did strengthen the defensive power of corps so much that successful defense against future attacks could be hoped for.
No outstanding decisions had to be made during the period of my command since, unfortunately, the enemy dictated the action. The principal activity at corps headquarters consisted of continually inventing substitutes to frustrate the enemy's designs with our weak forces and inadequate means; strengthening our units' defensive power through untiring improvisation and reorganization; and creating new units, to oppose the enemy.
Corps headquarters was supported in these tasks by the higher commands. All of them worked with the same energy, assigning new units, replacing arms and equipment as far as we could afford. Thus it came about that LXXXI Corps, completely without troops at the outset, was able to commit, at the Meuse River, units made up out of fragments - although without reserves - and at the beginning of the battle for the West Wall even had some reserves at its disposal.
The enemy
The enemy fought with chivalrous fairness. Their crushing superiority in aircraft, tanks, other armament, ammunition, and every other combat tool has been described.
According to German combat theory they did not utilize their superiority fully. According to the German theory the victor should pursue defeated enemy ruthlessly, to "the last gasp of men and horses", so that they cannot get any rest while in retreat or an opportunity to concentrate for a renewed defense. Such a method saves not only time but, above all, lives. This pursuit should be carried out not only by frontal pressure but by penetration and encircling maneuvers. In such a manner we often trapped and annihilated enormous enemy forces with inferior forces.
According to the German theory the enemy's operations were conducted far too cautiously. They seemed to intent upon their own security, even though our troops were so battered and weary that they could do nothing more.
The enemy's too methodical way of fighting was not adapted to the aforementioned pursuit theory. Time and again it enabled us to concentrate our battered and scattered units and to man new defense positions, so that time and again the enemy met renewed opposition. Thus they did not only lose much valuable time, but also far more lives than they would have lost through daring and ruthless pursuit.
Moreover, every day following the first of September their wary method of fighting increased our fighting spirit, which had shown serious symptoms of disorganization and disintegration at the Seine and the Somme Rivers. Very soon, therefore, we again had, at our disposal, steady and disciplined units devoting themselves to their country's defense with combat tried loyalty.
In addition, the enemy played too often with open cards. Although we had almost no air reconnaissance we could often figure out their plans through their troop movements, assemblies, and increased radio traffic. We then were able to shift accordingly our point of main effort by moving our few reserves about regrouping our artillery, and increasing the supplies of ammunition at probable focuses of battle.
According to both German and Russian combat theory the enemy's tank units were too scattered and were frittered away.
According to my own view the enemy might have advanced to better advantage, with their powerful armored forces, via Liege, Aachen, and Köln, into the plains of Westphalia, regardless of the German armies of the west which, through lack of easy mobility, could only slowly withdraw. Such an advance would not only have paralyzed and disarmed all the German armies of the West by cutting off entirely heir supply of arms, ammunition, and other equipment, but the psychological effect would have unnerved the whole German people and brought about a speedy end to the war.
