THE BATTLE OF HURTGEN FOREST,  NOV - EARLY DEC 1944

by Generalmajor Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr Von Gersdorff

SECOND PHASE 16 - 30 Nov

The Army now realized that the possibility for regaining the lost ground was now dim. Orders were therefor issued changing the mission from offensive to defensive. In this connection we consistently tried to keep control of the dominating terrain and to establish the front lines in the woods. On 16 Nov the expected large scale American offensive began striking the Army's northern flank with the American right wing. At this time the strong American attacks by the 4th Div were launched first in the woods against Roten Wehbach and later Weissen Wehbach. The defending elements of the 275 Inf Div could not prevent the advance of the 4th Div towards Grosshau. At this time, against our strongest wishes, we were again forced to commit the 116 Pz Div to prevent American troops from spilling out of the woods onto the open ground. The Division should have been withdrawn from the line and rehabilitated for the Ardennes offensive. The ever-pressing problem confronting us at Army was the reinforcement of the heavily engaged right flank of the LXXIV Corps. Since reserves were not available we adopted an expedient solution. The 272 and 277 VG Divs were periodically required to leap-frog their right flank battalion during the night to occupy the positions of their neighbor to the north. In this way we were able, bit by bit, to shift the weight north. The right boundary of the 272 VG Div, for example, initially was north of Monschau and ultimately was edged up to Zweifallshammer.

Besides this method the Army consistently tried to milk reserves from the LXVI and LXXX Corps. At first we were able to free only single battalions, separate field artillery battalions, etc. Now began a series of moves in which newly arrived VG Divisions on the Eifel front relieved the panzer divisions located there. (See attached sketch). The 18 and 26 VG Divs had in early Nov relieved the 2 SS PZ Div and 2 Pz Div, respectively. The two Pz Divs were not available for our use since they had to be readied for the Ardennes offensive.

The 18 and 26 Divs in mid-November each extended its interior flank, thereby pinching out the 344 Div which was in the center of LXVI Corps. The 344 Div thus became available for employment in the north. A few days later the 352 VG Div replaced the 353 Div in the LXXX Corps zone. The 353 Div then moved north and was committed on 20 Nov to further bolster the right flank of LXXIV Corps. Not an integral part of this shift to the north but indicative of the readjustment of units at this time was the insertion of the 212 VG Div above Trier. This division relieved the 36 VG Div which in turn was dispatched to the Saar front. Thus two divisions, the 353 and 344 Divs, were committed in mid-Nov in the Hurtgen Forest.

The 344 Div was originally known as the 91 Air Landing Div, which had been reportedly destroyed. A new designation was therefore applied. It was clear to Army that units like the 344 and 353 Inf Divs had little combat value in the unusually bitter fighting of the Hurtgen Forest. Since no other troops were available we had to content ourselves with what we had. With the arrival of these two divisions we were enabled, however, to withdraw the 116 Pz Div in preparation for its role in the coming Ardennes offensive. The Pz Div artillery remained several extra days in position, partially because there were no replacements and partially because we did not want to inform you of their withdrawal. Later, however, the Division once again had to detach a combat group to the south flank of the Fifteenth Army. The arrival of the two divisions also enabled us to withdraw the staff, key commanders, non-coms, and the supply echelons of the 275 Inf Div. The remnants of the infantry troops were absorbed by the 353, 344, and 89 Divs, as was the artillery.

All these complicated changes and reinforcements were accomplished during the relentless, bitter fighting of the Hurtgen Forest. In a steady, slow, meter-by-meter advance the numerically superior enemy forces were able to shove the front line back through the woods and into the cleared space of Hürtgen and Kleinhau.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Source: National Archives of the United States
Foreign Military Studies, A Series - A 891

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