by Generalmajor Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr Von Gersdorff
THE BATTLE OF THE HURTGEN FOREST
From the beginning of November and the operations which developed until the Ardennes offensive it is necessary to consider the reasons given before to fully appreciate the difficulties of the fighting. The men and officers were fully cognizant of the importance of this zone of operation and did their very best in its defense. Therefore, there existed the bitter fighting for every foot of ground and resulted in the counterattacks which at times were successful as well as unsuccessful. It is a fact that as the strength and bitterness of the fighting increased coupled with the conditions of the ground and the weather and the effects on all arms there was a similarity that was noticeable between this fighting and that of the last years of the first World War. (1) For the Seventh Army the Hurtgen area was always an "open wound", and was a very disturbing factor in the planning for the Ardennes offensive. Because of the continued fighting, Seventh Army was always forced to attempt to bring forward reserve troops for the battle in the Hurtgen. Those VG divisions that were in the area, we were forbidden to utilize because they had been earmarked for the Ardennes. (Pz and SS units were already under control of the Armies that were going to fight in the Ardennes). These divisions had to finish their organization and instructions behind the front, or in the inactive sectors, the only zones we were permitted to commit them. As an example of this, the 47 VG Div might be cited. (47 VG Div was almost completely destroyed in about three days just north of Schevenhütte in about mid-November when it was committed in a critical sector with incomplete preparation). Further it might be said that the Siegfried Line Divisions which possessed secondary troops and poor weapons were likewise ill-qualified for commitment in the difficult fighting of the Hurtgen. One of the big problems was the consistent lack of ammunition of artillery caliber. Because of that we were restricted to firing only about one fourth to one fifth the amount of ammunition that the Americans fired. In spite of that we successfully maintained offensive and defensive action west of the Roer so that the initial phase of the Ardennes offensive was insured. (Gen. Gersdorff pointed out that had the Roer River been crossed by the American forces the Ardennes offensive would not have been possible to execute in its original plan ).
