CHAPTER V
Initial Penetration by the 8th Regiment (15-19 November)
On Wednesday 15 November, final plans for the attack were completed by the 70th Tank Battalion which had been ordered to make the following attachments: Company A and two platoons of Company D were attached to the 8th Regiment; Company C and one platoon of Company D were attached to the 22nd Regiment; and Company B was attached to the 12th Regiment and the assault gun platoon was attached to the 29th Field Artillery Battalion. (2)
D-Day was l6 November 1944. The weather was clear and cold. At 0115 a coded message received at the tank battalion CP indicated that H-hour would be 1245. The 1st platoon of Company D moved out to join the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment. This regiment was attacking in column of battalions, 2nd battalion leading without artillery preparation. The point selected for penetration of the enemy MLR was just south of the east-west road which formed the south boundary of the 1st Division. The avenues of approach were fire breaks which were filled with concertina wire eight to ten feet high and heavily booby-trapped. In front of the wire the ground was sprinkled with Schu mines and covered by machine gun and mortar fire.
The attack started with infantry leading, and the tanks of the first platoon followed as support but were canalized to the fire break. When the infantry was held up by the concertina wire the tank platoon moved up and fired on the enemy covering positions. One of the tanks threw a track, and in trying to make repairs the crew suffered three casualties from hostile mortar fire. Other crewmen of the tank platoon attempted to evacuate these men and were wounded themselves by the murderous fire. The infantry was forced to dig-in and the tanks withdrew to re-supply. Thus, the first platoon of Company D had the first of many casualties to be suffered by the 70th Tank Battalion in the HÜRTGEN FOREST.
During the morning other tank platoons moved out in support of their respective infantry battalions. During this first day of battle the assault gun platoon fired as a battery 471 rounds of 105-mm; the targets being designated by FOs of the 29th Field Artillery Battalion. The 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, which had been attached to the division on 9 November, was relatively inactive. Because of the poor roads and heavy woods the destroyers were unable to get close enough to the front lines to give any support.
On the second day the 1st platoon Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, moved out at O83O to support the advance of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, in continuation of its attack. The infantry was still held up by triple concertina wire covered by heavy fire in addition to anti-personnel mines and booby traps. The medium tanks of this platoon made little better progress than had the light tanks of Company D on the previous day; they were stopped cold by heavy enemy fire. However, the TDs of the 803rd were able to render some support to the infantry.
On the third day, the 1st platoon of Company A was still in support of the same infantry battalion and fired 76-mm HS into the tangle of wire holding up the infantry and then pushed on across it with the infantry following in the tank tracks. Considerable progress was made. An unexpected ally appeared when a P-47 passing overhead joined in the battle. The tanks had their panels on display and the plane seeing the situation strafed the enemy lines. This caused some demoralization among the enemy and enabled the tanks and infantry to advance several hundred yards to breach the defensive MLR. A penetration of almost 1000 yards had been made on the third day of the battle; however, the advance could not be pressed further until the penetration had been broadened. With this in mind, the 8th Regiment decided to hold up and reorganize its positions. Two battalions were placed in the line with one held back in reserve.
The next several days the 70th Tank Battalion spent in slugging at the enemy. Small advances were made daily in most of the sectors assigned the infantry, regiments, but it was tough going all the way. The tanks and TDs continued to give the infantry all possible support commensurate with the poor road net and small number of passable trails.
Supply and re-supply was a gigantic task. During one period the only means of getting gasoline and ammunition to Company C was by the use of a weasel. An interesting and effective way of getting fresh water to the tank companies was the use of three large 250 gallon water tanks captured from the Nazis. They were mounted on one 2½ ton truck which made a daily run to each company with the ration truck. The company kitchens were kept forward with the companies during the entire operation. (3) Personnel casualties were evacuated through the infantry battalions with which the tanks were working at the time.
