CHAPTER V
Planning the Attack (1-16 Nov)
Dispositions of the 4th Division at this time are shown in Map 3, Appendix V. The plan of attack called for the 8th Regiment to be committed on the left, the 22nd Regiment to take the center, and the 12th Regiment the right flank. The 8th was given the mission of assisting the advance of the 1st Infantry Division on the north and of keeping contact with that division; the 12th had orders to attack north and northeast and envelop HÜRTGEN and then close in on the 22nd Regiment and continue the attack to the northeast; the 22nd occupied a three-mile gap between the south boundary of the 8th Regiment and the front line of the 12th. Because of the rugged terrain and the strength of the enemy defenses it was impossible for one regiment to attack on this broad front, so the 22nd was to penetrate on a narrow front in the center of its sector, seize GROSSHAU, then turn northeast to GEY. As planned this would result in the 8th and 22nd Regiments converging on the ROER near DÜREN while the 12th covered the right rear.
The German front line crossed the division north boundary 1000 yards east of SCHEVENHÜTTE and ran due south to the salient occupied by the 12th Regiment north of GERMETER. The Germans had been fortifying their position for two months and had built a rigid line of barbed wire and extensive minefields across the entire front. Obstacles, bunkers, and entrenchments had been built up in the south to a depth of one mile and in the north portion to a depth of two miles.
Initially facing the 8th and 22nd Regiments were about eight German, battalions of the 275th Infantry Division reinforced. A number of reserves were available to the enemy, and the bulk of two other divisions and elements of still others were encountered during the course of the battle. Nearly all of these were of poor to mediocre quality.
During the planning phase the American front line in the sector of the 4th Division was held on the north by elements of the 47th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division and on the south by the 298th Engineer Combat Battalion. There was no action along the front except for harassing artillery fire. Field Order #53, 4th Infantry Division, dated 7 November, announced that the division would pass through these units on the line and attack with the 1st Infantry Division on its left to secure crossings of the ROER at DÜREN and south thereof.
Everything was in readiness by 10 November but the attack was dependent on favorable flying weather. Every effort was made to preserve the secrecy of the impending attack; therefore, lines of departure for the regiments were 1000 yards west of the enemy lines. Six long days were spent in waiting for the weather to clear before the attack started. Despite this long wait there was no air action on the enemy defenses in front of the division as occurred in front of the 1st Division. It was felt that an air attack in such dense woods as faced the 4th would impracticable.
