CHAPTER IV
Conclusions
The 745th Tank Battalion had behind it months of intimate association with the men of the 1st Infantry Division. The same platoons had accompanied the same infantry battalions day after day across Europe, and their state of training could hardly have been better, At the opening of the battle in the HURTGEN FOREST they stood at one hundred percent strength in men and equipment. True there was a sprinkling of green replacements here and there in the tank crews, but not enough to affect the status of the battalion. Altogether there could hardly have been a better unit selected for a test of tanks in support of infantry in the difficult terrain of the HURTGEN FOREST.
The assistance given by the 745th Tank Battalion to the operations of the 1st Division was not great when measured in terms of strong points taken or enemy destroyed, but when considered in the light of the nullifying effect that they had upon enemy tanks, and the encouragement that their presence gave the division foot soldier their value was far out of proportion to the destruction they wrought.
It is plain that the tanks were used whenever there was the slightest chance that they could be of any value, to the extent that at times they were a definite hindrance. The noise they raids and the blocking of the trail at MERODE certainly contributed to the failure of the assault on that town, but elsewhere in terrain equally as difficult their assistance ranged from slight to considerable. In the words of Lt Col Wallace J. Nichols, the 745th Tank Battalion commander, "In spite of the hilly terrain, woods, limited road net, and mud, the tanks were employed successfully."
The use of tanks in small units preceded by infantry or closely surrounded by them was unquestionably the only practical way in which they could have been employed. Their mobility and armor protection meant nothing on the forest trails, but their machine guns and the fire of their cannon as assault guns were encouragement to the infantry that sometimes carried the attack through. It is true that during the battle the 745th could count more tanks out of action due to terrain difficulties than due to enemy action. The remaining ones proved that regardless of how difficult the terrain may seem, and how little advantage may be taken of the tank's basic merits, we must have them there first and in greater numbers than the enemy.
| PERSONNEL CASUALTIES | |
|---|---|
| Type of Casualty | Total |
| Killed in Action | 3 |
| Wounded in Action | 79 |
| TOTALS | 82 |
| TANK CASUALTIES | |
|---|---|
| Cause | Total |
| Mines | 2 |
| Direct Fire Weapons (AT guns, tanks, panzerfausts, bazookas) | 5 |
| Artillery or Mortars | 8 |
| Terrain (Mud or obstacles) (*) | 13 |
| Mechanical Failure (**) | 0-10 |
