CHAPTER IV
Combat Operations
With knowledge gained from unhappy experience in previous assaults in the HURTGEN FOREST, the First United States Army laid careful plans for a new assault that would sweep to the ROER RIVER. Artillery was massed in support from every unit under First Army control; plans were laid for a formidable bombing along the whole front by more than 2500 bombers from United States and British air forces, and ground forces were carefully briefed until all was in readiness. D-Day was set for 16 November, and for six cold, miserable days the tankers and infantrymen sat and waited. It finally came, wet cold, and overcast, but at 1100 the weather cleared and the bombing began. (3)
It was one of the largest pre-attack bombardments yet employed in front of an army, and the part of it which fell in the 1st Division zone seemed enough to churn the forest and hills into rubble. The towns of HAMICH and GRESSENICH were saturated, and the woods on all sides were splintered and smoking when H-hour came at 1245.
As the smoke of the bombing cleared away, the 16th Regiment moved out of SCHEVENHÜTTE toward HAMICH with its attached tanks following. Due to terrain obstacles and the limited fields of fire the tanks of Company A, 745th, struggled forward with their assigned infantry battalions without firing. (4) At the same time the 47th RCT jumped off from the woods south of GRESSENICH with that town as their objective. With them were the attached tanks of Company A, 746th Tank Battalion, which accompanied the leading elements of the infantry in this more suitable terrain. The third element of the attack was the 26th Infantry Regiment which attacked northeast through the woods from SCHEVENHÜTTE with the mission of seizing the high ridge about one thousand yards away. Company C 745th Tank Battalion was unable to be of much assistance to them in this steep, wooded terrain, but did accompany them, breaking their own trails as they advanced. The rest of the 1st Division remained in positions east of VICHT awaiting developments. Each of the assaulting regiments' tank destroyer companies from the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion remained in its attack position. (5)
High above the towns of GRESSENICH and HAMICH, commanding observation into these objectives and all the approaches to them, was enemy-held HILL 232 (K996446) which allowed the Germans to rake the whole valley with accurate artillery fire. In addition, in spite of the massive bombing, in the towns of GRESSENICH and HAMICH the enemy soldiers came out of the cellars and foxholes and quickly manned the defenses and the attacking troops were met with heavy fire as soon as they approached their objectives. Company A,746th, attacking HAMICH, lost two of its tanks under the heavy artillery and direct fire which came in on them as soon as the attack jumped off. One of these tanks was the platoon leader's, and of its crew he was the only man left unwounded. (6) Under this shelling the infantry attack slowed and finally stopped after reaching the near edge of the town. In GRESSENICH, almost the same thing happened to the 47th Infantry, and the 26th Regiment with its supporting tank company made only a short advance toward its objective.
The following day, 17 November, the Air Force again bombed in front of the First Army with tremendous formations, and the 1st Division concentrated seventeen battalions of artillery on Hill 232 (K996446) before the attack was resumed. This time Company A 745th accompanied the leading elements of the 16th Regiment on the right side of the SCHEVENHÜTTE-HAMICH Road, while a platoon from the 634th TD Battalion advanced along the road. Inside HAMICH the TDs and the accompanying infantry took one side of the street while the Company A tanks and their infantry took the other. The attack reached the center of town before it was halted by a determined enemy counterattack launched from the northeast end of the town. In this first counterattack one tank knocked out an enemy self-propelled gun at the end of the town's main street, but a German Mark V moved from behind a house not sixty yards away and shot through the frontal armor of the Company A tank before it could fire again. The infantry worked up close enough to hit the Mark V and it withdrew, apparently undamaged. After darkness fell the Germans counterattacked again with five tanks and about two hundred infantrymen, firing flares and supported by heavy artillery concentrations. The artillery set fire to one of the Company A tanks and one TD, and their flames lit the whole area. (7) The 16th Regiment ordered its men under cover and called in time fire from its own supporting artillery, but this only slowed up the fighting, and made the tank action of both forces more important. One of the Mark Vs groping its way in the darkness only dimly lit by the blazing American tanks, drove within eight yards of a Company A tank without seeing it. The gunner soundlessly swung his turret and fired at the Mark V at this point blank range destroying it. (8)
Plate VI.
At ranges under 100 yards our 76mm guns would penetrate the frontal armor of the German Mark V,
but at longer ranges the rounds merely glanced off.
Four separate counterattacks were launched within HAMICH during the night, and in the mixed up fighting the German and American losses were about equal. One of the Panther tanks fell in a bomb crater during the darkness, giving the Air Force credit for another kill although by this time the pilots were safely in their bunks in England. The bazooka teams of the 16th Regiment also managed to destroy one tank, while Company A lost two more M-4s to enemy bazooka teams and one of the TDs was set on fire either by mortar fire or hand grenades. (9) Despite the stubborn resistance at every house, and the numerous counterattacks, at daylight the next, 18 November, the 16th Infantry Regiment held most of HAMICH and was preparing to move to the northeast and finish clearing the town.
In GRESSENICH the 47th RCT and its supporting tanks from the 746th Tank Battalion were engaged in a similar action, but with less success. At daylight on the 18th they held only half the town while enemy artillery fire directed from HILL 232 poured in on them.
Company C, 745th, with the 26th Regiment continued to have more difficulty with the terrain than with the enemy and was unable to give much support. The infantrymen advanced through the woods leaving what roads and trails there were for the use of the tanks, but the enemy had expected just that and the roads were well defended. A roadblock and wire, covered by mortar and machine gun fire stopped the advance of the tanks on 17 November and there was no way to bypass in the narrow wooded valley and the tanks could only wait until the 26th infantrymen advanced beyond it.
The first two days of the First Army assault showed that despite the hopes and plans, there would be no easy advances to the ROER, but instead, a continuation of the slow, costly struggle. In the 1st Division zone the advance continued, but even the attacking units had so little room for maneuver that it is understandable that a whole regiment and a portion of the 745th Tank Battalion were not employed in the first days.
On 18 November the Company A tanks which had not entered the town opened fire from the woods southeast of HAMICH, using fuse delay 75 mm HE on the houses in the enemy held part of the town. After fifteen minutes of this firing the white flags began to appear and soon the rest of HAMICH was in the hands of the 16th Regiment. Then, as soon as plans could be made and disseminated, the attack on HILL 232 jumped off from the edge of town. In the words of Lt. William K. Sanders, an officer of the 745th:
... It was the sweetest example of infantry-tank cooperation that I have ever seen. A medium tank platoon of the 745th, a light tank platoon of the same battalion, and a destroyer platoon from the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved out from HAMICH, carrying as many infantrymen from the second battalion of the 16th Infantry as possible on their decks. They advanced up the gradual slopes of HILL 232, firing at the ridge line and likely German positions and observation posts as they moved. There was low underbrush on this part of the hill, but not enough to interfere with tank movement. About halfway up the hill the infantry dismounted and pushed ahead on foot while the tanks continued their fire at the dug in German positions and the ridge line in general. An enemy self-propelled gun in the vicinity of (016446) kept the tanks under fire most of the time and an enemy tank in the same vicinity knocked out one of the Company A tanks. However, the infantry advanced to the crest of the hill without a loss.
At this instant the German artillery opened up on the American tanks, firing high explosives and some large caliber jellied gasoline shells. These shells made intense fires wherever they struck, and to avoid tank losses back down the hill about-two hundred yards to positions out of German observation but where they could still give direct fire support to the infantry on the ridge line.
On top of the hill the 2nd Battalion infantrymen were separated from the Germans by a low embankment about twenty feet wide behind which the Germans were dug in. Here both sides tossed hand grenades at each other, but the tankers could see every German who showed himself to toss a grenade and often fired their 75's at single Germans, scoring direct hits a few yards in front of their own infantry. (10)
About this time, late afternoon of 18 November, a heavy concentration from our own 3rd Armored Division Artillery fell astride the lines on top of the hill. Fortunately, it caused no casualties among our own men, but the damage to their morale can be easily imagined. (11) At the same time the Germans launched a strong counterattack with about two battalions of infantry supported by tanks. The German tanks remained in place about eight hundred yards to the east and fired direct support for the counterattacking infantry who were partially successful and managed to drive the 2nd battalion from the top of the hill and halfway down the western slope. The hilltop changed hands several times during the next two days, but the tanks played no great part in the fighting.
After a lull in the fighting on 19 November, the 1st Division assault began anew on 20 November. The 16th Infantry attacked the high ground east of HAMICH with six tanks of Company A carrying troops and leading the advance. They crossed the open ground on the outskirts of the town, firing their guns at the houses. They went on until they reached cover where the infantry dismounted and pushed ahead on foot. A few hundred yards farther east a German tank attempted to change position in order to fire on the American tanks; a P-47 pilot caught the movement from above and set it burning with rockets.
In several cases we were unable to destroy the enemy tanks firing at us from long range but were able to cause them to move. When they showed themselves by movement, our Air Corps P-47s got them with rockets. Whenever the weather was good there were P~47s in the air over us, but much of the work they did was, out of our observation, and we learned of it only when we overran tanks and SP guns that they had-knocked out. (12)
While the 16th Regiment fought east from HAMICH, the 18th, supported by Company B, 745th, moved in to attack WENAU (F015445); in the woods to the east the 26th regiment attacked SCHLOSS LAUFENBERG (F029445), with its Company C tanks still hampered by limited fields of fire and narrow muddy trails. One element of this last group moving down the road which branched west toward the objective of the 18th, WENAU, lost two tanks to the Panzerfaust fire of unseen Germans. Still further west the 47th RCT, 9th Division, continued the struggle to clear GRESSENICH.
Between 20 and 27 November the 16th Infantry and its accompanying tanks advanced painfully through the woods and the muddy fields until its advance was stopped by the fire from German troops of the 3rd Parachute Division holed up in GUT MERBERICH (F020475). A battalion of German Infantry held out in ROSLERSHOF CASTLE (F015473) and it was planned to use tanks to shoot or smash down the gates through the castle walls.
The Germans could not fire effectively from the castle walls except with machine guns and small arms, so six tanks of Company A attacked across the muddy, brush covered fields with accompanying infantry, but the tanks bogged down almost immediately. In spite of the hostile fire the platoon leader, Lt J. W. Sullivan, jumped from his tank and aided in placing logs, towing one tank with another, and guiding drivers until the tanks finally reached the castle where in traditional cavalry style they stormed through the gates with the remaining infantry firing in all directions and forcing the defenders to surrender. (13)
In front of the 18th regiment and its B Company tanks SCHÖNTHAL (F023459) fell, but a strong German counterattack from LANGERWEHE recaptured the high ground to the north, HILL 203, (F022468) and defended it strongly. Further to the east a depleted regiment of the German 47th Volksgrenadier Division held out against the attack of the 26th Regiment and its C Company tanks until the night of 24 November, when it finally withdrew, suffering few losses, and at long last the enemy was driven out of GRESSENICH by the 47th RCT which went on to take SCHLOSS FRENZENBERG (F018490) by 27 November.
The Germans apparently attached considerable importance to HILL 203 in the zone of the 18th Infantry Regiment, but it had to be taken before an attack could be launched against LANGERWEHE so on 27 November the 18th attacked. The enemy had sited anti-tank guns and machine guns in the heavy stone-walled houses that covered the southern approaches to the hill, and they took their toll of the advancing tanks shooting three of them as they moved with the infantry on the narrow road. (14) When the defenders saw the attack launched on HILL 203 they summoned a counterattack by troops of the 2nd German Parachute Division from LANGERWEHE, but it moved in behind the hill just as the full fury of the 18th's supporting artillery fire fell and was almost destroyed. The defenses of the hill broke, and close behind the retreating Germans the infantrymen of the 18th and their tanks rolled into LANGERWEHE. Farther to the east on the same day, 27 November, the 26th Regiment attacked a town, JUNGERSDORF (F040467) which finally allowed the supporting tanks of Company C to give them worthwhile support. At last their fields of fire for the tanks, and their direct fire added to the heavy artillery preparation helped the 26th to drive the 3rd battalion, 3rd German Parachute Division from the town. However not all of Company C fared so well – almost at the same time that the attack on JUNGERSDORF was succeeding, the platoon with the 2nd battalion of the 26th, approaching MERODE (F048452) was having what the battalion executive, Major Howell H. Heard, called "the sorriest experience of the war". MERODE was approachable by any type of vehicle from the German side but by only one narrow, soggy trail from the American side. Nevertheless it had to be taken, for it controlled the main road net in that sector of the forest. When the attack was launched, the C Company platoon was to advance down the narrow forest trail and the infantry battalion was to attack through1 the woods. In advancing down the muddy, tree-lined trail the third tank in the platoon column overturned, completely blocking the trail; cutting off the two tanks behind it. Thus the tank attack consisted of two tanks. When they reached the town one of them received a mortar round on its rear deck which set fire to the bedding rolls and the tarpaulin there. The crew decided to go back into the woods to put out the fire and when they withdrew, the other tank pulled out also, and when the infantrymen reached the town they had no tank support. (15) At this instant the 2nd Battalion, 3rd German Parachute Division counterattacked and cut off the two infantry companies in MERODE. With their MSR blocked, no tank support, and no hope of reinforcement, they were forced to surrender the following day. There was some feeling that the tankers had failed them in turning back without orders, but considering the strength of the German counterattack, this probably made little difference.
The stubborn resistance of the enemy had cost the 1st Division heavily, but it cost the defenders even more. First Army reports that by the end of November the 1st Division and its supporting troops had destroyed the fighting effectiveness of, the 104th German Regiment, the 47th Volksgrenadier Division, and the German 12th Infantry Division. It is not claimed that these were full strength, first line divisions, but they had been determined, effective fighting forces. (16)
On 1 December the 1st Division line paralleled the ROER RIVER, running from LANGERWEHE through JUNGERSDORF to MERODE, with no major terrain obstacles in front of them. The Germans held out in MERODE, successfully blocking the roads to the northeast. Supporting the defenders of MERODE was the artillery of the 3rd German Parachute Division and the 47th Volksgrenadier Division, altogether a formidable array when combined with the terrain obstacles on the 1st Division side which limited the attack to foot troops, supported only by what could be hand carried through the woods. In the face of these obstacles the, 26th Regiment made no further attempt to take the town and the 1st Division shifted its attack to the north.
In front of the 16th regiment and its tanks from Company A the enemy had withdrawn from GUT MERBERICH when LANGERWEHE fell, and had retreated into LUCHEM (F037490). In preparation for the attack on this town the 16th lined up all of its tanks both light and medium, and its TD company, A, 634th. The attack jumped off without artillery preparation, and the tanks reached the edge of town almost before the Germans knew what was happening. When they did, the inevitable counterattack came from ECHTZ, (F070484), but the 1st Division artillery, poised waiting, destroyed it before it had crossed the open ground between ECHTZ and LUCHEM.
With the loss of LUCHEM, German activity in the 1st Division zone almost ceased, and both the forces did little more than patrol their fronts from then until 7 December when the 1st Division was relieved by the 9th Division and withdrew to a rest area in BELGIUM, taking with it the 745th Tank Battalion and the 634th Tank destroyer Battalion.
