CHAPTER II
Summary
The material aid of the 746th Tank Battalion to the advance of the 9th Infantry Division in the HURTGEN FOREST was limited principally by the terrain; but the use of tanks in spite of physical difficulties benefited the division because of the psychological effect of tanks – they encouraged our own infantry and terrified the enemy. In almost every instance where tank support was possible, the infantry was enabled to advance more readily. Tank support might have been better if infantry commanders had realized the importance of the employment of tank-infantry-engineer teams to help keep the tanks moving. Engineers with the infantry division had little training with tank units, and this fact, coupled with the rugged terrain of the HURTGEN FOREST, meant that the infantry often failed to get the tank support to which it was entitled.
The 9th Divisions efforts to penetrate the HURTGEN FOREST ended with the relief of the 39th and 60th Regiments by elements of the 28th Infantry Division on 28 October. All of the action of the 9th was preliminary to the First U.S. Army's deliberate plan to clear the forest on its way to the ROER RIVER dams and ROER RIVER crossings. On the front originally approached by the 9th Division in September, the army was to employ two corps – the V and VII – before the ROER RIVER was to be crossed in February.
