CHAPTER II

Employment of Tanks

Advance to Contact was generally made with tanks leading and infantry mounted thereon. However; no set formation was used throughout the division. The 1st Platoon, Company C, 746th Tank Battalion, led the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, on 14 September from ROETGEN towards LAMMERSDORF. A platoon of infantry rode the tanks until they were fired upon by an anti-tank gun just outside of LAMMERSDORF. Thereafter the infantry flanked the tanks on either side of the road.

The 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, moving through ROETGEN toward the north on the same day, mounted Company B on five tanks and four tank destroyers. The 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, crowded two companies on the same number of vehicles while moving through the KONZENER WALD south of ROETGEN.

Organization for Combat has already been indicated in that each infantry battalion normally had a platoon of five tanks. Usually, the terrain dictated that the tanks be used by section rather than by platoon. Rarely were they used singly except for special purposes such as pillbox reduction.

Captain James R. Shields, who commanded Company C, 746th Tank Battalion, stated that although only one tank could fire at a time in attacking through woods, a second tank always followed to give the first protection. In practically all situations infantry accompanied tanks and Capt. Shields emphasized that in the woods flank protection by the infantry was more essential than elsewhere because of the extremely limited observation.

The First Well-Organized Defenses met by the 9th Division were dragon's teeth covered by numerous pillboxes and other enemy emplacements. Capt. Shields indicates that the 1st Platoon of his company, accompanied by dismounted infantry of the 3d Battalion, 39th Regiment, attacked in column through the dragon's teeth on the main road southeast of LAMMERSDORF on 17 September. A crater in the road at the dragon's teeth gap proved no obstacle; the tanks proceeded right through it. However, 100 yards beyond the crater the lead tank was knocked out by long range anti-tank fire from the east. When the third tank was also disabled the remaining tanks retired and the attack bogged down. On 18 September the tanks tried to pass through a gap in the dragon's teeth farther to the south. The engineers had blown this gap, but the Germans mined it persistently despite the efforts of both infantry and engineers to keep it clear. The right suspension system was blown off the first tank to enter the gap, and blocked the gap for the rest of the day.

Three tanks got through this gap on 19 September, but in attacking HILL 554, the first was hit by bazooka fire and another, by anti-tank fire. The third returned to LAMMERSDORF. Captain Shields mentioned that although infantry were in the vicinity, they were not alongside the tanks.

Reconstituted to a three-tank strength, the platoon again passed through the dragon's teeth on 20 September to aid the infantry to reach the top of HILL 554. Lt. Col. R. H. Stumpf, the 3d Battalion commander, noted that despite the loss of one tank to anti-tank fire the other two continued to shoot up the enemy in the trenches.

Pillbox Reduction was the next problem faced by the infantryman and attached tankers. Each tank company found its own solution, although tank-infantry cooperation was almost invariably the rule. Normally, only one tank was included .in the assaulting team.

Company A, with the 47th Infantry, fired armor-piercing ammunition on the doors of the pillboxes and caused the enemy to surrender hastily. In one instance, infantrymen fired small arms on the apertures while the tank approached within 20 yards of the door. Three rounds from the tank gun caused fifteen Germans to surrender. In a second instance, the tank fire was effective at 600 yards. The occupants surrendered after four rounds hit the door.

Company B, with the 60th Infantry, used its tanks in conjunction with the infantry to fire on apertures. Then infantry and engineers flanked the pillbox and blew in the door with high explosive charges. Troops of the 2d Battalion met pillbox resistance in clearing the road from MONSCHAU to HÖFEN. Two tanks first assisted by driving enemy from surrounding houses into the pillboxes and then by helping to kill fifty enemy reinforcements and driving off 100 others. Under cover of tank and infantry fire, infantrymen poured gasoline on the pillboxes and tankers fired on them to ignite the pillboxes; twenty occupants surrendered.

Company C, with the 39th Infantry, found that the most successful pillbox attacks were those employing smoke and fire and maneuver. The smoke was employed in two ways: (1) to screen movement and (2) for casualty effect. The tactics used by the 39th Regiment are described in the following combat interview:

In reducing the pillbox at (968287), Company E, 39th Infantry, used a TD and a tank to fire at the openings, a squad of infantry, a half squad of engineers using poling charges, a squad of flame throwers and white phosphorous smoke. The TD closed the embrasures by firing from a distance of about 400 yards, and the infantry followed behind the vehicle protecting it from enemy infantry. 60-mm. mortars were used to run the enemy from his emplacements into the pillbox, while the tank moved up to a range of 200 yards and then finally 50 yards. The direct firing and the pole charge seemed to be ineffective. Finally, one of the infantry saw a crack in the door of the pillbox, and in there he threw a white phosphorous grenade. The enemy came piling out. (2)

Using much the same tactics, Company F reported taking nine pillboxes in one hour and ten minutes on 17 September. Because of the terrain, tanks could not always support the attacks, and the infantry experienced more difficulty in capturing the pillboxes. The unsupported infantry attacks lacked shock effect. Rarely did tanks venture forth without infantry support, but in the final attack on HILL 554 on 29 September, the 1st Platoon, Company A, 746th Tank Battalion, outdistanced its supporting infantry and reduced the resistance in five or six pillboxes.

Obstacles, both natural and man-made, continually limited the effective employment of tanks in the HURTGEN FOREST area. Usually, the enemy supplemented the natural obstacles with every means at his disposal — the effect of the dragon's teeth has already been discussed.

During the advance to contact, several unprotected road blocks held up the advancing tanks. These were usually time consuming nuisances. On 14 September, Company C tanks with the 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, were held up about an hour at a railroad crossing by an iron gate protected only by mines. Later in the day they met a more common type of road block — trees felled across the road. These trees did not happen to be mined or covered by fire as was usually the case. The tankers solved their problem by looping cables around the trees and pulling them out. A tank dozer was used to fill in craters in the road.

Engineers were not always readily available to remove mines at these road blocks. Captain Ralph G. Edgar, commanding Company A, 39th Infantry, cited two instances. The first was on 14 September when moving through LAMMERSDORF where the tanks were held up most of the day awaiting removal of mines at a crossroads. Again on 9 October, tanks supporting his company in the attack, on GEEMETER were held up from 0830 until 1400 before the engineers arrived to clear mines.

German defenders blocked and mined the fire lanes through the rough, heavily wooded forest. Capt. Shields stated that sometimes it was possible to take paths through the woods, but usually tanks found it best to avoid the fire lanes and go directly through the woods.

Tank obstacles had a very definite effect on the efficiency of the tank-infantry-team. Neither element of this team operated as efficiently alone as when the two fought together. In some instances the whole attack was held up when obstacles stopped the tanks. In other instances, as when the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, was attacking in the area southwest of GERMETER on 9 October, the tanks progressed just far enough to break the enemy resistance and allow the infantry to go forward 1,000 yards. However, on one occasion the 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment, advanced from GERMETER to a road junction 1,000 yards to the southwest without armored support. They accomplished the mission quickly on 10 October by following rolling barrages of the 4.2-inch and 81-mm. mortars. The armored support was held up by a mined road block and arrived at the road junction two hours after the infantry had secured it.

Tank-Infantry Attacks were seldom deliberately planned and even when they were planned they were not always successful. On 11 October, tanks of the 1st Platoon, Company C, led Company A, 39th Infantry, in the attack from GERMETER to VOSSENACK at 0830. The platoon had four tanks which proceeded in column along the road with the infantry following in column of platoons. After advancing 500 or 600 yards, the lead tank was destroyed by anti-tank fire. The other tanks retired as did the infantry. An artillery concentration was brought down on the enemy anti-tank guns. At 1100 the three remaining tanks again led the infantry into the attack down the road. Just before reaching the knocked-out tank, the second of the three was disabled by anti-tank gun fire. The lead tank, trapped on the road between two disabled tanks, was hit while maneuvering to withdraw. One tank remained and upon its withdrawal the attack on VOSSENACK came to an end.

The combined arms attacks of armor and infantry were generally more successful than this, however. While clearing the road from FINKENBUR to LAMMERSD0RF on 15 September, Company A, 39th Infantry, without tank support, was held up trying to secure an important road junction. The arrival of two tanks to support the infantry caused the enemy to withdraw without further fighting. Two days later Company I of the 39th, attacking east from LAMMERSDORF with tank support, reported that the enemy broke and ran — the same enemy which had held up the infantry attack the previous day. Northwest of GERMETER on 9 October the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, used two companies of infantry and two medium tanks to clean out a strong enemy patrol which had succeeded in disabling a light tank on the north flank of the regiment's position. The following day the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, captured GERMETER with tank support. Capt. Edgar attributed the lightness of the resistance to the presence of the tanks. Capture of GERMETER enabled the tanks to proceed northeast on the road and assist the 3d Battalion in recapturing WITTSCHEIDT which the unsupported infantry had lost on the previous day.

An outstanding example of successful tank-infantry attack took place on 9 October when the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, took the road junction at RICHELSKAUL with its tank platoon giving good support. A 10-minute artillery preparation preceded the attack at 0800. Then tanks and infantry worked their way to the edge of the woods 200 yards east of the road junction. The tanks broke out of the woods abreast of the infantry, which was in line of skirmishers on both sides and to the rear. Both tanks and. infantry fired every weapon. A German lieutenant raised up out of the bushes, fired his bazooka, which penetrated the turret of the lead tank and slightly wounded the tank commander. The tank returned the the fire with a 75-mm. shell which cut the German officer in half. This so demoralized the rest of the defenders that they broke and ran from their well dug-in positions, and the tank-infantry team killed fifty and captured twenty-five of the enemy. Prisoners stated that after the officer was killed they were afraid to use the other twelve bazookas in the company.

Capt. Shields considered the psychological effect of the tanks on the enemy as the prime consideration in using armor in difficult terrain. He stated:

Within woods, the chances of hitting the enemy are relatively slight. But the shock and psychological effect is great. The enemy would generally give up when the tanks got to a position where they could fire at close range, even though they [the enemy] could not be hit.

Tanks captured by the Enemy were sometimes turned against our troops. For example, the Germans put two of the tanks disabled near V0SSENACK in position to fire one our troops in GERMETER, although they did not actually keep them manned. To prevent their use by the Germans, an infantry patrol protected a tank crewman who set off incendiary grenades in the tanks to destroy them

Tank Road Blocks were occasionally established for short periods in a moving situation. The 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, used tanks with infantry support as road blocks southwest of JÄGERFAUS in the early stages of the HURTGEN FOREST battle and north of GBRMETER on 9 October. The 3d Battalion used them similarly in LAMMERSDORF on 14 September. These were all one-day stands. The 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, used its tanks with infantry in a stable road block position for almost a week between 19 and 25 September at the south edge of MONSCHAU. In SCHEVENHÜTTE, the 3d Platoon, Company A, 746th Tank Battalion, covered all routes of approach from positions within the town. For the first few days no foot troops were in position to give close support to the tanks.

Defensive employment of Tanks was usually accomplished by using tank platoons as a mobile reserve for the infantry battalions to which they were attached. During the first week in SCHEVENHÜTTE the tanks were used as road blocks, but by the time the enemy made its final attempt to recapture the town on 22 September the tanks and tank destroyers were used as a mobile striking force. They moved up and down the main street firing machine guns and 76-mm. shells at any enemy who presented himself as a target.

Defense Against Airborne Attack was the mission given to the 2d Platoon, Company A, 746th Tank Battalion on 19 October. The platoon was used on the high ground in the vicinity of FLEUTH (K973404) with the mission of guarding against possible glider landings.

Weather added to the difficulties faced by the tankers during October. Only seven days during the month were listed as "fair to good." Most of the rest were either cold and rainy or cold and cloudy. Fog frequently held up attacks planned for early morning — for instance, the attack on GERMETER on 10 October was scheduled for 0830 but was held up until 1400 because tanks supporting the 39th Infantry could not advance because of the fog.

Withdrawal of Tanks from the perimeter of the infantry defenses at night was a source of friction between tank and infantry commanders in the 60th Regiment. Lt. Col. Hupfer, commanding the 746th, pointed out that the inability to pull tanks back had two principal defects: (1) green replacements had to be placed in tanks by taking them to the vehicles at the front without orientation to crew or vehicles; and (2) proper maintenance and service of vehicles could not be accomplished. This latter defect was possibly the more serious problem. The tanks of Company B were continuously on the line from 1 to 24 October. Lt. Col. Hupfer indicated that many tanks became inoperative because auxiliary motors to charge the batteries could not be operated – the resultant noise brought down mortar concentrations which caused many casualties among the infantrymen near the tanks. Frequently the infantry units regrouped behind the protection of the tanks, but the tanks were never given the opportunity to drop back to perform necessary maintenance. The solution finally reached by agreement on 24 October was that the tanks would normally drop back to a position near the infantry battalion command posts where they could get proper care and still be on call of the battalion commander in an emergency. This policy was pursued by the other two regiments.

Communications between the tanks and the infantry were improved during the period by three methods:

1. SCR-300 radios were installed in seven tanks per company for tank-infantry communications
2. telephones linked with the-tank interphone systems were installed on the rear of all medium tanks to facilitate ground to tank communication
3. SCR 509-510 radios were established at the infantry battalion command post for an additional channel of communication.

Enemy Tactics were best described as tenacious. The enemy defended his positions effectively by making the most of fortifications well suited to the terrain. He employed mines with abandon and used concentrations of heavy mortars and artillery. He prepared field fortifications outside his pillboxes and fought from these until driven inside.

Anti-tank weapons used were:

1. the panzerfaust, a hand-carried anti-tank weapon for close-in fighting
2. the self-propelled gun which was used to support his counter-attacks
3. an anti-tank rocket launcher mounted on wheels with a very low silhouette. Anti-tank guns were not plentiful because of the limited fields of fire and the enemy elected not to use his tanks in this terrain during this period.

Morale activities for personnel of the 746th Tank Battalion during September and October were very limited, but some of the men were sent on pass to VERVIERS, BELGIUM. Laundry was accomplished fairly regularly through quartermaster facilities.

Casualty figures are available only for the month of October. Disregarding those "injured in action" (who were hurt when a truck overturned) the personnel losses indicate that about three men were lost each time a tank was permanently disabled. (Figure 3)

PERSONNEL CASUALTIES
Type of Casualty	Officer	EM	Total
Killed in Action	1	3	4
Died of Wounds	1	0	1
Missing in Action	1	0	1
Seriously Wounded in Action	3	19	22
Lightly Wounded in Action	1	10	11
Lightly Injured in Action	0	6	6
TOTALS	7	38	45

TANK CASUALTIES
Tank Type	Losses	Breakdown of Losses
Medium Tank M 4	10	AT Gun Fire	3
Medium Tank M4A3E2	1	AT Rockets	5
Light Tank M5A1	1	Mines	3
		Artillery	1
TOTAL	12

 

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