Penetrating the Westwall

1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division)

13 - 22 September 1944


The description of the engagement at Nütheim, and those at Büsbach, Diepenlinchen, Weissenberg, and Stolberg that follow, are based on Captain Lavasseur's paper previously cited; on a report dated 3 July 1945 from 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, to the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, subject: "Infantry Battalion Employed with Armored Division;" on the Unit Journal of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry 3 September 1944 — 1 October 1944; and on oral accounts from veterans who participated in the fighting.

On 16 September, perceiving a growing disconnect between the attack of CCA toward Münsterbusch and Atsch, and the thrust of CCB through Mausbach toward Gressenich and Eschweiler, Major General Maurice Rose, commander of the 3d Armored Division, ordered Task Force Hogan at Dorff to attack to the north, and to clear the town of Büsbach, about 2000 meters away, located on the edge of the Schill Line fortifications. As the TF approached the outskirts of Büsbach, its lead elements were fired on by a machine gun presumed to be in the church steeple. The 155-mm SP was brought forward to fire at the steeple. [The church at Büsbach was restored after the war, but the reconstruction was short-lived; the steeple eventually had to be removed]. The 155-SP was also used against pillboxes, and its concussions broke every window in Büsbach. Company B, 26th Infantry, fought through the town, halting under heavy fire within sight of the dragon's teeth on the edge of Münsterbusch. Company A, 26th Inf, missioned to clear Brockenberg, and to take high ground vicinity Bauschenberg, adjoining Büsbach on the eastf cleared three large pillboxes using the rifle fire - tank gun method. The company found some 2,000 civilians who had sought shelter in a gravel pit nearby. Company C cleared Büsbach, and was held as TF reserve in the town. Anti-tank and artillery fire intensified, and it became evident that Germans were determined to keep the Americans out of Stolberg.

Only a few Americans sensed that the German soldiers they were encountering on the 16th were categorically different from the fragmented detachments that had formed their initial opposition inside Germany. Stolberg and its southern defenses were manned by troops from the 105th Panzergrenadier Brigade of the 9th Panzer Division, a battered tactical unitr but a cohesive force nonetheless. On the 16th fresh tactical units began arriving in the Aachen sector from the Russian front, lead elements of the 12th Infantry Division (12 ID). Hitler personally selected the division for modernization in 1944, and it was reorganized and re-equipped that summer as a "Type-1944 Infantry Division." Authorized a total of 14,800 men, it had three regiments of infantry, each with two battalions: 27th Fusilier Regiment, and the 48th and 89th Grenadier Regiments. Alerted for movement on 12 September, 12 ID had moved by rail from near Danzig to the Aachen sector, and thanks to bad flying weather that interfered with Allied air interdiction, had arrived there expeditiously, at full strength, fairly well trained, and with all its heavy weapons (except its assault guns, which were promptly replaced from the resources of higher headquarters). Importantly, its 12th Artillery Regiment had nine batteries of 105-mm howitzers, and three batteries of 150-mm howitzers. The division's antitank battalion had twelve 75-mm antitank guns.

On 16 September the principal German headquarters in the Aachen sector, Seventh Army, published an order to its corps that "Seventh Army will defend the positions and the West Wall to the last man and the last bullet...The penetrations achieved by the enemy will be wiped out. The forward line of bunkers will be regained..."

On 16 September 12 ID received the following order:

  1. Repulse advancing enemy forces wherever they will be met.
  2. Close the gap Stolberg-Mausbach-Vicht-Zweifall [6000 meters south-southeast of Stolberg].
  3. Retake and re-occupy the Westwall sector between Stolberg and Zweifall by employment of the complete combat force of the division.

 

MAP BREACHING WESTWALL

The map above is from the U.S. Army's The Siegfried Line Campaign. The battle accounts here are taken from Captain Levasseur's paper previously cited; a report dated 3 July 1945 from l/26th Infantry to the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, subject "Infantry Battalion Employed with Armored Division", the Unit Journal of l/26th Infantry 3 Sept-1 Oct 1944, and on oral and written accounts of veterans.

Information on German orders and dispositions is based on Report # 3 published by the Traditionsverband ehem. 89er Kameradschaftsführer Hans Zeplien [head of the 89th Regimental Veterans Association], dated 3 May 1953, written by Gerhard Lemcke, last commander of the 89th Infantry Regiment, entitled "Employment of the 89InfRegt in the Period July 1944 to April 1945." The report is supported by photographs and maps. The English translation quoted here in italics is that of the Traditionsverband. The 26th Infantry Regimental Association is indebted to Herr Günther von der Weiden of Busbach for this valuable amplification of its records, especially since the 26th and the 89th were to face each other again in December, at Bütgenbach, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge.

Colonel Lemcke, commanding the 89th Grenadier Regiment reported that:

The fast movement of the division was conducted without incident. Bad weather conditions denied the enemy use of air power. So the enemy did not recognize the approach of this fresh division, both when crossing the Reich and when arriving at the unloading area. Therefore the division was in position to show up unharmed in the operations area.

1st and 3rd battalions of 27 Füselierregiment when unloaded (east of Eschweiler)... in the early hours of September 16 immediately were loaded again onto all available transport means, including civil buses normally used for line traffic and workers, and lorries. In the meantime the division was informed about the villages of Mausbach, Gressenich, and the southern parts of Stolberg having been lost to the enemy [reference is to the advance of CCB] who was also reported to have penetrated Atsch with reconnaissance elements. [reference is to the advance of CCA]. Verlautenheide (east of Aachen) was taken by US forces [reference is to the advance of the 16th RCT]. Quick action was therefore required. Outflanking of the town of Aachen from the south the south and the southeast was imminent. In addition a breakthrough to the river Rhine across the river Roer near Jülich and Düren (east of Eschweiler) was to be expected. After limited reconnaissance the 1st battalion 27 Füs Regt was employed ...to take ridge near Verlautenheide. The 3rd Battalion - dismounted in Düren - passed Weisweiler and Eschweiler and arrived at the sector southwest of Eschweiler. Both battalions encountered the enemy in the early morning hours already. Smaller elements ahead of the main force of 1(US)InfDiv quickly were pushed out of Verlautenheide and out of the built-up area south of Atsch. After tenacious fighting Verlautenheide was taken by 1st battalion 27 Füs Regt and cleared from the enemy the same day. 3rd battalion 27 Füs Regt regained the Westwall positions on both sides of Münsterbusch after having repulsed weak enemy forces, and pushed through the southern part of Stolberg succeeding in establishing connections with lost elements of 9 Panzerdivision holding clusters of bunkers there. An uninterrupted front line consisting of a system of strong points was established by 27 Füs Regt until the evening of Sept 16. Also links were established with 116 Panzerdivision - the right neighbor - in the Verlautenheide/Eilendorf. By this the threatening encirclement of the town of Aachen could be postponed. In addition US forces were prevented to push towards Juelich for the time being by the taking of the Verlautenheide ridge. 1st (US) InfDiv, taken by surprise, resisted varyingly. [Lemcke]

Charles MacDonald, in The Siegfried Line Campaign [the official U.S. Army account] records that: In the late afternoon [of 16 September] a platoon of the l6th Infantry patrolling north of Eilendorf reported the enemy approaching the village of Verlautenheide in a column of twos "as far as the eye could see." That night almost every unit along the front noted the noise of heavy vehicular traffic, and the 47th Infantry [9th Infantry Division] at Schevenhütte captured a German colonel who had been reconnoitring, presumably for an attack... The 12th Infantry Division was moving to attack, and Germans' situational awareness appeared to be superior to that of the Americans. The 89th and 48th Grenadier Regiments detrained on the morning of 17 September and were promptly committed to counterattack CCB and the 47th Infantry to its east:

Although its 2nd battalion not yet had arrived, 89 GrenRegt had to attack at about midday already because of the fact that increasing artillery activity from the Kornelimünster area and assembly of troops supported by a few tanks south of Diepenlinchen were identified, which led to the assumption that the enemy was about to attack. The regiment took Werth, Weissenberg, and the Diepenlinchen slag pile after fierce fighting, but suffered serious losses. The attack had to be interrupted several times caused by the fact that the local population which had not been evacuated in time wandered around the mentioned area and often met the American as well as German lines of fire... forcing the local commanders to stop firing. This was at cost of time. There was no way to continue the attack. The regiment halted the line gained until the evening and dug in. [Lemcke]

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



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