21-27 NOVEMBER 1944 (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Francis D. Linse
Some of the lessons emphasized by this operation are:
Adequate time should be given for reconnaissance and personal contacts before the relief of the unit is executed. Invaluable information as to enemy locations, volume of artillery fire and mines used, and nature of the terrain can be obtained.
Close support of the infantry by the artillery is not possible in heavy woods.
Extra wire and radios must be provided to facilitate communications.
Where evacuation and supply by motor is impossible, additional personnel for carrying parties must be provided.
Aggressiveness of subordinate leaders and small units, especially platoons and squads, is mandatory in successful attacks through wooded areas.
Small advantages should be exploited to the maximum by all units.
Breaching of heavily mined areas is costly, both in men and time used, and every attempt must be made to locate gaps or to by-pass such obstacles.
Open foxholes are useless and troops must provide overhead cover for their protection. Extra pioneer tools must be provided for this use.