Operations of the 893d TD Battalion (-Co A)
in support of the 28th Infantry Division
in the vicinity of Vossenack, Germany
2-9 November 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)

By Major John J Lavin

EMBLEM TD

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion (-Co A), in the vicinity of VOSSENACK, Germany, 2-9 November 1944, during the battles of the HURTGEN FOREST.

In order to orient the reader it will be necessary to discuss briefly the major events which led up to this action.

You will recall that the Western front at the end of October was fairly stabilized, with the German Armies occupying terrain favoring the defense. To the north, water barriers faced the British and Canadian forces, in the center the SIEGFRIED LINE and METZ fortifications faced the Twelfth Army Group, and to the south the VOSGES Mountains faced the Allied forces. 1

In this center area First Army was to launch an attack toward COLOGNE with its main effort on the left in the sector of VII Corps. 2 V Corps on the right off VII Corps was direct it to conduct a preliminary operation to secure SCHMIDT and the ROER River dams to prevent the enemy from using the dams to flood the area to the north through which the major attack will pass. 3 The 28th Infantry Division as part of V Corps had moved into positions east of ROTT, Germany by the 27th of October, and prepared to jump off 31 October. 4

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Immediately to the north, VII Corps was building up to launch the main attack in the direction of DÜREN and COLOGNE as soon as the dams were seized. To the south, other elements of V Corps were prepared to join the 28th Division in rolling up the difficult Siegfried Line defenses from the flank and rear as far south as MONSCHAU. This would give us another good supply route to the Cologne Plain.

In planning the attack of the 28th Division it was assumed that it would be an infantry action for several reasons. Aerial photographs and intelligence information indicated that there was no road or trail from VOSSENACK to SCHMIDT and therefore no vehicles could support the attack initially. Another reason was that the SCHMIDT area was apparently free of enemy armor. Finally, it was believed that our artillery and air force could effectively isolate the battlefield once the operation started. 5

DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS OF THE 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION

To assist the reader in understanding the narrative and the actions of the tank destroyer battalion it is necessary to describe the dispositions and plans of the division in some detail.

MAP C
MAP C

The 28th Infantry Division was disposed with three regiments generally abreast on a 5 mile front. (See Map C) Employment of its regiments was practically dictated by V Corps. The 109th Infantry on the north was to attack north through the forest until it reached the cleared ridge on which the town of HURTGEN was located.

This would serve two purposes: first, secure the north flank of the division from serious counterattacks which the enemy had launched from this direction on the division which the 28th had just relieved. Secondly, it would secure a line of departure from which another division could later use to seize the town of HURTGEN. 6

On the right of the 109th Infantry the 112th was to attack to secure VOSSENACK then turn southeast and take KOMMERSCHEIDT and SCHMIDT, the latter being the primary objective of the division. 7 The 110th Infantry, less one battalion which constituted the division reserve, was on the right of the 112th Infantry and was to attack south, secure objectives along the KALL River and the road between SCHMIDT and KESTERNICH. To their right (west) was the 28th Reconnaissance Troop operating south of JAEGERHAUS.

Division Artillery was to support the attack with conventional fires on all known or suspected targets from (H-60) 0800 D-Day and thereafter largely on call of the infantry. The 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (- Co A), the unit with which we are concerned, was operationally controlled by the Division Anti-Tank Officer who served as a member of the staff of the artillery commander. This battalion was initially assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the general support artillery, and preparing plans for the employment of the battalion in the anti-tank defense of the division's zone. 8

The opposing forces were estimated at 5000 Infantry on the immediate front of the division of which 2000 were not yet committed. These troops were to major elements of the German 275th Infantry Division. Additional troops could be moved in from less active fronts. 9

The 28th Division after almost a months rest on a quiet sector of the Siegfried Line had received many replacements and was nearly full strength. Its combat efficiency was excellent, while that of the Germans was considered good. 10

Poor weather prevailed before and during the operation, whith fog, rain, snow and cold cloudy days following each other. Roads in the division area were a few and as a result of wet weather, soggy. The terrain was hilly and generally heavily wooded with cleared ground on the ridges where towns were located.

The status of supplies was good, the major shortage in all units being overshoes. Artillery ammunition was in limited supply, but considered adequate for the operation.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



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