THE OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BATTALION, 8TH INFANTRY
(4TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE HURTGEN FOREST,
GERMANY, 16-22 NOVEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)

By Lieutenant Colonel James W. Haley

PATCH 8TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

LESSONS

Many lessons were brought out by the actions of the 2nd Battalion in the Hurtgen Forest. Some of the more important of these are as follows:

  1. Troops who are to fight in heavily wooded areas must receive training for this type of operation.
  2. Maintenance of control and direction in dense woods is very difficult. Plans must include provisions for overcoming these problems and suitable formations must be adopted.
  3. In rough, heavily wooded terrain, plans must include provisions for hand carry of supplies and ammunition for extended distances. The evacuation of the wounded by hand must also be planned for.
  4. In the attack, the effectiveness of close support by artillery and mortars is greatly reduced in dense woods.
  5. In heavily wooded areas, troops must provide their foxholes with overhead cover for protection against tree bursts of artillery and mortar shells.
  6. The gloom and low visibility which exists in dense forests during periods of bad weather destroy morale.
  7. Adequate information of the terrain and enemy defenses must be available before a successful attack can be planned.
  8. To attack a position a second time from the same direction with the same scheme of maneuver after the first attack has failed, unless unavoidable, is unsound.
  9. Adequate troops must be available to insure that units who have been encountering heavy resistance in difficult terrain and bad weather conditions can be frequently relieved from combat for rest and rehabilitation.
  10. Plans for the attack of prepared defensive positions must include provisions for breaching mine fields and barbed wire entanglements.
  11. Troops who are suffering from excessive fatigue become careless and the casualty rate rapidly rises.
  12. Troops who are required to remain in the line for long periods without relief reach a state of low morale and combat efficiency which causes an increase in the casualty rate.
  13. A unit which has suffered heavily in an unsuccessful attack must be allowed sufficient time for reorganization before continuing the attack.
  14. Surprise increases the chance for a successful attack.
  15. Higher commanders must recognize when a unit has reached the point when it is no longer capable of making a successful attack.
  16. Tanks are relatively ineffective in heavily wooded areas which are heavily mined.
  17. Whenever possible, new replacements must receive a period of indoctrination by their new unit.
HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Top of Page

Sitemap