The Operations of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry
(1st Infantry Division) during the initial penetration
of the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of
Nütheim, Germany, 13 - 20 September 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)

Analysis and Criticism

By Captain Armand R. Levasseur

A proper analysis of this operation requires an appreciation of the situation of both German and Allied forces in western Europe early in September 1944. Failure of the German High Command to react promptly to the critical situation in France in July and early August resulted in the destruction of large forces scheduled for defending their fortified frontier. Aerial supremacy gave the Allies a great advantage in mobility, due to its paralyzing effect on logistical support of German forces, as well as limiting tactical maneuver.

However, this was somewhat cancelled by the loss of close logistical support on the Allied front due to unprecedented extension of supply lines.

As the Allied prospects of a campaign on the Siegfried Line drew near; a proper evaluation of its defenses and advance planning for the actual assault would have facilitated greatly the initial penetration. The necessity for a rapid breakthrough was fully realized but combat forces had to improvise tactics and resort to the trial and error method in finding the best assault technique. This proved costly in men, materiel and time.

Armor, which had dominated the battlefield throughout the rapid pursuit, was reduced to a secondary role when confronted with a permanent type defensive position. It remained for the infantry and engineers to destroy antitank guns and barriers before the armor could bring its fire power and mobility to bear on the enemy.

On the night of 12 - 13 September a limited attack by the armored infantry to reduce antitank guns and permit the engineers to blast a road for the tanks undoubtedly would have saved many casualties on the following day. The enemy's excellent observation, covered positions end underground communications with supporting fires should have dictated an advance under cover of smoke or darkness.

On the night of 13 - 14 September Company A should have checked frequently for contact with, elements to the rear, particularly after crossing shelled areas and obstacles. The results in this instance were most fortunate; however, under less favorable circumstances the results could have been disastrous.

Severing of German communication lines undoubtedly denied some of their troops advance warning of our attack, making possible the surprise capture of five crew-served weapons on the night of 13 - 14 September.

Mopping up operations on the morning of the 14th were greatly facilitated by an envelopment earlier during the night. The principle of by-passing strong points to destroy the enemy from the rear proved inexpensive not only in men and ammunition but also prevented the enemy from escaping to fight again another day. The German quickly lost his desire to fight once his route of escape was sealed. In addition, pillboxes were comparatively blind from the rear, making close-in assault easy unless covered from other positions.

On the 15th, civilians in the town of Dorff were not properly notified to remain indoors at all times. The two civilians shot during the hours of darkness could have agitated some of the local populace to hostile action. The situation did not permit evacuation of civilians but proper S-2 contact with local authorities could have minimized friction.

The commitment of Company A at Diepenlinchen on a mission which had proved beyond the capability of a battalion earlier in the day only resulted in further losses. The lack of its accustomed normal supporting fires on this mission materially reduced its fighting effectiveness.

In this connection, Company A experienced similar difficulty with supporting artillery the following day when shell fire twice disorganized its attack at jump-off time. The supporting artillery consisted of 105-mm self-propelled howitzers. The artillery personnel believed the shelling received by Company A was enemy counter-fire, which sounds logical when it is recalled that the area involved had recently been occupied by an alert enemy. However, to an observer witnessing the concentration, it appeared that the shell bursts searched toward our own troops as the concentration developed. This could be understood when it is considered that the self-propelled guns were firing from muddy standing, causing the rear of the mount to sink in the mud with each round fired. Failure to adjust the piece after each round, under such circumstances, would result in each succeeding round dropping closer to our lines.

The abortive attempt of Company C to envelop the enemy's right flank on 19 September was foreseen by the local commander on the ground and proves the futility of higher commanders directing attacks without proper evaluation of limitations imposed by the terrain and local situations.

Good use of tank shock action made on the night of 19 - 20 September may have discouraged further enemy counterattacks, if such had been planned.

The task force commander showed good flexibility in planning when, on the morning of 20 September, plans were quickly changed to take full advantage of concealment offered by the fog just prior to the attack.

The cooperation between infantry and armored unit commanders throughout was excellent, although initially teamwork was awkward due to lack of familiarity with characteristics of the other arm. Toward the close of this operation great strides had been made toward mutual respect, confidence and close teamwork between armor and infantry.

The 81-mm mortars rendered close and continuous support except where lack of ammunition precluded such support, and proved a most valuable weapon. Where the situation did not permit prior registration, effective fire could be placed on targets quickly by accurate map location of targets and efficient use of a compass and a fine lead pencil at the gun position.

Lessons

Some of the lessons learned by this operation are:

  1. Night attacks against limited objectives can achieve success but must be preceded by detailed preparation.
  2. Specialized training prior to attacking fortified positions will ensure maximum use of fire power and coordination so essential to success.
  3. Lack of mobility and flexibility greatly reduces the potential strength of a defense.
  4. Contact at night must be maintained from front to rear as well as rear to front to avoid losing the integrity of a unit on the move.
  5. Each unit must provide its own security at all times to prevent surprise.
  6. Good communications are vital to successful defense.
  7. An attack should be directed at enemy weaknesses rather than dissipating a force on enemy strong points.
  8. Infantry removed from its normal supporting weapons will suffer a loss in combat effectiveness.
  9. There is no real substitute for a personal reconnaissance.
  10. The fire power and shock action of tanks, when properly employed, greatly reduce the enemy's will to resist.
  11. Infantry that fights with tanks should train with tanks so that each can capitalize on the capabilities and know the limitations of the other.
  12. Areas selected for tank employment should be suitable for maneuver.
  13. Tanks cannot remain stationary in the face of enemy antitank fire but must maneuver or take cover.
  14. Tanks attract enemy fire and, when employed with infantry, may cause excessive casualties to infantry.
  15. Use of tanks with infantry removes the element of surprise in an attack.
  16. There is no general rule of procedure for infantry-tank employment. The situation may call for tanks to proceed ahead of the infantry, behind the infantry, or one of the two elements may be left behind in an attack. The commander on the ground must make the decision in each case.
HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



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