(4TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE HURTGEN FOREST,
GERMANY, 16 NOVEMBER - 3 DECEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Major Frederick T. Kent
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
A study of this operation reveals several factors which deserve a thorough analysis from a critical point of view.
First, it appears that the zone of action assigned to the 4th Infantry Division was much too wide. Although there probably were cogent reasons why this was necessary, it appears that the defensive capabilities of the enemy in this sector were grossly underestimated and that the offensive capabilities of the American troops in this type of terrain were overestimated. This may have been caused by the optimism resulting from the rapid drive across France and Belgium and the widely-held opinion that the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. It may also have resulted from a failure to appreciate fully the vast difference between fighting in open terrain under favorable weather conditions and fighting in the close, rugged terrain of the Hurtgen Forest area under bad weather conditions. Whatever the cause, it resulted in "sending a boy to do a man's job."
Second, the frontage assigned to the regiment initially, approximately 3500 yards, could not possibly be covered adequately by one regiment in this type of terrain. Consequently, the regiment, in order to employ sufficient mass in its effort, was forced to confine its attack to a frontage of less than half its assigned zone. This resulted in uncovered flanks, by-passed enemy positions, and the ever-present threat, of encirclement of the regiment. The enemy was able to maintain artillery observation posts within and adjacent to the regimental position from which accurate and devastating fires could be and were directed. The assignment of a zone of action which could have been covered completely and which could have been completely cleared of enemy as the unit advanced would have been tactically sound and would have resulted in considerably fewer casualties than were sustained. As the action progressed, the zone of action was narrowed by successive boundary changes which gradually eliminated the likelihood of enemy infiltration and the by-passing of enemy positions from which fire could be directed or from which attacks could be launched against the flanks or rear of the regiment.
Third, the failure to relieve the regiment, and the remainder of the division, after a few days of fighting as severe as this action, was in my opinion, the direct cause of hundreds of casualties which might have been avoided by the timely relief of the division by a fresh, battle-experienced division. The excessive casualties, combined with the frequent attack missions, necessitated the immediate employment of replacements as fast as they arrived. The exposure of these fresh, inexperienced troops to the unusually rigorous and hazardous conditions encountered in the forest before they could be properly integrated in the fighting team was, in my opinion, almost a criminal waste of valuable manpower and should never have been allowed to occur.
Fourth, in terrain such as this and with weather conditions as they were, the division should have been furnished additional engineer support. The requirements in mine-clearing and road maintenance were beyond the capabilities of the organic engineer battalion, and the advance of the regiment was actually stopped several times by the excessive hand carries necessary to re-supply and evacuate casualties. Faster clearing and repair of roads would not only have simplified the supply and evacuation problem, but also would have permitted the earlier movement of supporting armor to the front line units. Armor often could not be used when it was vitally needed because it just could not be moved over the existing roads and trails.
Fifth, the direct order received on 29 November to capture GROSSHAU that day resulted in unnecessary casualties. The regimental commander was aware of the nature of the defenses in the town and had conceived a plan (approved by division) which would have forced the enemy to withdraw or surrender. The capture of the town by frontal assault was unnecessarily costly and contributed little or nothing to the accomplishment of the ultimate mission. In my opinion, the prerogative of the regimental commander in determining how to accomplish his mission was encroached upon. This is generally not considered to be accepted policy.
Sixth, it appears that a penetration of the forest might have been avoided entirely by the execution of a holding action in the forest with a penetration on one or both flanks followed by an encirclement of the enemy forces thus contained. Here again, for reasons known only to higher headquarters, such a course of action might not have been possible. However, It seems that in this operation strength was committed against strength where a quicker, easier path to victory lies in committing strength against weakness.
The accomplishment of the regimental mission in spite of the seemingly insurmountable obstacles, was a tribute to the exceptional tactical skill, judgment, and aggressiveness of the regimental commander, Colonel Charles T. Lanham (later Brigadier General), who at all times kept his command under control and who enjoyed the implicit trust and confidence of his subordinates.
LESSONS
Some of the lessons learned in this operation are:
- Zones of action in the attack should be assigned so as to permit the observance of the principle of mass and should depend on the strength of the enemy defenses.
- A narrow penetration which leaves flanks unprotected is extremely dangerous In that it permits infiltration into rear areas and observation and adjustment of fire on assaulting units.
- Adequate reserves of ammunition and rations must be maintained in a unit which is liable to encirclement and isolation.
- In woods fighting, where artillery and mortar fire is more than normally effective, communications facilities must be reinforced to reduce the possibility of a complete break down.
- In situations requiring resupply and evacuation by long carrying parties, additional personnel must be assigned to this duty.
- Roads and trails in soft terrain may be mined in layers and one sweeping may not disclose all mines.
- A unit should be removed from the line when, excessive casualties have been suffered, and replacements should be integrated in the unit and trained before the unit goes back into combat.
- The capabilities of the enemy should never be underestimated.
- In woods fighting, fragment-proof overhead cover is essential if casualties are to be minimized.
- Engineer support must be adequate if an attack is to proceed as desired.
- The effectiveness of armor in woods fighting is greatly reduced.
- The determination of the individual soldier to continue fighting under the worst conditions is the most important factor contributing to success in battle.
