APPENDIX VI

ARTILLERY

Much has been said in the accounts of the HURTGEN FOREST fighting of the intensity and volume of the German artillery fire. Each infantry unit involved felt that it was more severe than any it had previously encountered; the effect of hostile artillery on tanks was unusually great. Certainly the enemy which had been beaten back through FRANCE stiffened his resistance before the ROER RIVER, and an impressive feature of this resistance was his artillery fire.

On the 1st of October the number of enemy artillery battalions in the AACHEN area was estimated to be 25; this total had increased to 34 by October 2lst * * * Moreover, a definite improvement in the tactical employment of enemy, artillery was observed * * * Massing of fires as well as the coordination of widely separated batteries were noted. Heavier caliber weapons were used and these included both field and railroad artillery. Some counter-battery fires were received and all indications showed that a more "artillery conscious" enemy was defending GERMANY. The ability of the enemy to switch the bulk of his fires from one critical area to another also became apparent. This was illustrated when an attack was made by V Corps in the general direction of SCHMIDT on 2 November and later on 16th November when the drive to the ROER RIVER by the VII Corps was resumed. (1)

Artillery units of brigade and corps size were encountered about 1 December. By this time there were estimated to be a total of 68 battalions of German artillery along the First Army front. This total was part of the buildup for the ARDENNES.

It is significant that this sudden stubborn defense on the part of the enemy artillery units came at a time when the Americans were seriously short of important calibers of artillery ammunition. However despite the shortage the Americans were pouring back twice as much artillery as the Germans were firing. Thus, although ammunition was rationed, we may still speak of Allied artillery superiority. First Army's 43 artillery battalions and 13 Tank Destroyer Battalions in addition to the organic divisional artillery units were more than adequate to accomplish all missions. This is an imposing total of artillery units and the statements of many captured Germans pay respectful tribute to its effect. According to one captured German officer " * * * when our positions were smothered, without warning, by an American artillery concentration - then, not even birds or rabbits could escape." (2) And as the First Army Artillery Section points out, "The frequent shortage of artillery ammunition stands alone as a limiting factor in the artillery support rendered during the operations * * *"

During the period 15 October - 28 October which saw the fall of AACHEN the expenditure of artillery ammunition in the First Army fell sharply due to the limited amounts of such ammunition in the supply pipeline. Only the most lucrative targets were attacked. During the period 29 October - 11 November the rationing of ammunition continued to be strict and the major effect of the artillery with the Army was used in repulsing repeated counterattacks in the HÜRTGEN - VOSSENACK - SCHMIDT area. In the next phase from 12 November to 25 November First Army launched its coordinated offensive with VII Corps driving toward the ROER, later joined by V Corps. Increased allocations of artillery were received unexpectedly, and were badly needed in view of the dogged fighting which characterized the offensive.

During this period expenditures were held to a minimum in the VIII Corps zone, reflecting the nature of the action along the Army front. Between 26 November and 9 December artillery in the V and VII Corps zones was active in supporting the continued offensive but regrouped toward the end of the period in order to prepare for a new attack on 10 December. This period, 10 December to 15 December brought increased allocations of artillery ammunition with a corresponding increase in the amount of fire laid down. For the five periods outlined corresponding expenditures for the 105 mm howitzer; 155 mm howitzer; and the 155 gun M1 are indicated in Figure 14. These are the calibers most affected by the ammunition shortage.

During this time one 105 mm howitzer battalion was reequipped temporarily with 18 75-mm howitzers to take advantage of the plentiful supply in that category. The artillery also improvised by using 36 German 105 mm gun-howitzers for which approximately 20,000 rounds were available, while captured ammunition was used by the 155 mm gun M-12 battalions. The use of the 4.5 inch rocket launchers by the 18th Field Artillery Battalion was an expedient forced by the shortage of ammunition, but this new weapon worked quite well when it was employed on area targets.

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