CHAPTER VI
Summary
The action of the 8th Infantry Division in the HURTGEN operation centered largely, around the 121st Regiment which attempted to secure for the CCR, 5th Armored Division, a line of departure for an attack on the HÜRTGEN-KLEINHAU area and then to the south. Light tanks of the 709th Tank Battalion were employed without success along the firebreaks in front of the infantry battalions and up the GERMETER-HÜRTGEN ROAD. The failure of armor at this time can be attributed largely to the fact that mud mired the tanks and mines disabled them.
Because of the slow progress of the 121st Regiment CCR tried to attack through them on 25 November without success. It was apparent that armor could not be employed in mass until the clearing which surrounded HÜRTGEN could be reached. It is interesting to note that on 25 November when CCR could not break through, a tank-infantry-engineer team employed farther west where advances had previously been halted was able to reach the edge of the forest. The theory of combined arms seems sound when the members of the team play their respective roles; the infantry protects the engineers while they clear a path for the tanks. It is to be emphasized that mere grouping of the several arms does not in itself provide a team; teamwork and close coordination are essential. It is further noted that, after this success, the attack bogged down for about three days until at noon on 28 November another team, consisting of elements of Company A, 709th, 2nd battalion 121st Regiment, and part of the 12th Engineer Battalion, was formed and immediately moved in and captured HÜRTGEN. The effective results of the work of this team indicate that it would be advantageous for combined arms teams to have the opportunity of working and training together prior to actual combat.
The fall of HÜRTGEN permitted CCR to pass through the infantry, seize KLEINHAU and continue its attack to the south. Also with the fall of HÜRTGEN the 28th Regiment in V0SSENACK began moving east in conduction with the 121st. During the move of the 121st to the Corps objective tanks were used in platoon and section size units in support of the battalions in the forest.
As the Corps objective was approached the main effort of the 8th Division began to shift to the zone of the 28th Regiment and the tanks were gradually shifted to that area.
The role of the 709th Tank Battalion in the HÜRTGEN FOREST battle is not one to be used as an illustration of armored principles of mass action, maneuverability, and violent attack. Rather, its main contribution was close support of infantry by individual tanks in slow, plodding advances that were measured in yards rather than miles. It is felt that the main lesson to be learned is the necessity for complete understanding, for coordination and cooperation between platoon size tank and infantry units which operate or expect to operate together.
The actions of the 709th Tank Battalion are very similar to those of the other separate tank battalions which were attached to infantry divisions in the Battle of the HURTGEN FOREST. All five of the battalions normally fought individual tank platoons in support of infantry battalions. In one or two instances tanks were massed in company formations – never larger. But always, the tanks of these battalions supported the infantry to which they were attached, and their actions were ordinarily dictated by infantry commanders. An examination of the actions of the 5th Armored Division – the only large armored unit which fought in the HURTGEN FOREST – may disclose whether its problems differed essentially from those of the tank battalions which have been discussed thus far.
