CHAPTER VI
Assault to HÜRTGEN (12-28 November 1944)
The 121st Infantry Regiment attacked with three battalions abreast at 210900 November toward the forest clearing southwest of HÜRTGEN. The attack was launched through the positions of the 12th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, located generally north and west of WITTSCHEIDT, but bogged down almost immediately because of the heavy concentrations of mortar fire and the dense anti-personnel mine fields encountered. Company I, on the right flank of the regiment, was the only company to reach its objective, the edge of the forest south-west of the town of HÜRTGEN.
On the following morning the regiment resumed its attack with the 1st battalion in the center making the main effort. The 3rd battalion on the right strengthened its positions, on the edge of the forest but made little forward progress in spite of the repeated attacks and the support of the Corps artillery. The 2nd battalion meanwhile advanced about 200 yards and reached the edge of a fire lane short of the objective. The lack of success was due principally to mortar fire, dense woods, mine fields, and heavy artillery fire. By evening it was apparent that much greater progress must be made on the next day if a line of departure for CCR of the 5th Armored Division was to be secured.
On 23 November the regiment again attacked with three battalions abreast without appreciable gains. The 2nd platoon of Company D, 709th was attached to the 1st battalion 121st Regiment, and the 3rd platoon Company D was attached to the 3rd battalion. It was first planned to use the tanks of the 2nd platoon in the firebreaks ahead of its infantry battalion, but four of the five tanks bogged down before reaching their but four of the five tanks bogged down before reaching their positions. It was then planned to use the 3rd platoon of Company D in front of the 3rd battalion against a strong point which had been holding up both battalions. The tanks bogged down en route to the 3rd battalion, and when they finally arrived at 1645 the lead tank became mired again and blocked the advance of the others. At 1700 the enemy counter attacked along the entire regimental front but was repulsed after a 30 minute engagement. By nightfall the line of departure for the attack of CCR of the 5th Armored Division which was to initiate Phase II still had not been secured and the attack of CCR scheduled for the 24th was delayed.
On 24 November the remainder of the 709th (less Company C) was attached to the 121st Regiment for employment on the following day and was held ready to fellow CCR in its attack on HÜRTGEN. Company C of the 709th was attached to the 2nd Battalion 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. The 121st Regiment continued its attack with the 1st Battalion, made no gain; the 2nd Battalion on the left gained 500 yards to face HÜRTGEN from the west, and the 3rd Battalion on the right advanced about 200 yards east of the GERMETER-HÜRTGEN Road. The 3rd platoon of Company D, 709th still attached to the 3rd battalion was given the mission of wiping out a machine gun that was holding up the infantry. At 0900 the 3rd battalion began a coordinated attack on both sides of the road with the attached light tanks in support. The lead tank was disabled by a mine although the road had been cleared the night before. Either the Germans had mined it again or the engineers had failed to clear all the mines. The platoon leader dismounted to check for mines and stepped on an anti-personnel mine which blew off his legs. A German self-propelled 88mm gun further disabled the tank with three direct hits, killing one member of the crew and wounding another. The other four tanks turned back since they could not pass the first tank, which, together with a large crater beside it, blocked the road. At 2150 a tank recovery vehicle from Company A, 709th, went forward to pull the tank off the road. Some 200 yards short of its goal it hit a mine which knocked off a track. Men of the 12th Engineer Battalion went up during the night and blew up the tank in order to clear the road, but discovered two other, large craters blocking the road beyond.
Meanwhile, to the northwest, the 2nd platoon of Company D with the 2nd battalion of the 121st Regiment had the mission of supporting the infantry in an advance to the forest edge. Mines and obstacles halted the advance and the tank attack was called off.
The situation as seen at the close of 24 November by Division Headquarters was as follows: the advance of the 4th Division on the north seemed to insure that an attack by the 121st Regiment against the HÜRTGEN-GROSSHAU (F052381) RIDGE could be supported from that flank; progress had been slow in the 121st regimental zone; combined attacks by light tanks, tank destroyers, and the bulk of the 3rd battalion made slight progress on the south flank.
In general, the situation in the 121st Regimental zone, was still net conducive for an attack by CCR, 5th Armored Division, on 25 November. However, the arrival of German reinforcements in the HURTGEN area and the expected arrival of more reinforcements indicated the necessity of an attack by CCR without delay. The 8th Infantry Division plan contemplated that the 121st Regiment, reinforced by the 709th Tank Battalion (-) and Company A of the 644th TD Battalion, follow CCR and mop up and occupy HÜRTGEN, KLEINHAU, and HILL 401 with, one reinforced battalion on each. The 22nd and 12th Regiments of the 4th Division were to support the attack from positions west of HÜRTGEN and KLEINHAU, while Company C of the 709th was to be made available to CCR at KLEINHAU.
At 250730A November the 121st Regiment renewed its attack toward the edge of the forest. The 2nd battalion on the left made the only appreciable gain, about 700 yards. The 2nd platoon of Company D, 709th, attached to this battalion had been instrumental in its advance to the edge of the forest.
"To get to the edge of the forest, Co E, 121st Regiment, pulled out first. It had a detachment of engineers from the 12th Engineer Battalion and the 2nd platoon from Company D, 709th Tank Battalion. Company G went to the left of the minefield and then across country to a hairpin turn in the road to the east. They took out a machine gun which was in a set of road blocks along the road near this turn. When a team was organized it went down the road. The infantry led, then the engineers, and finally the tanks. The infantry protected the engineers while they removed some 100 anti-tank mines and 4 road blocks. Tanks helped knock out bunkers. Approximately 38 prisoners were taken. There was wonderful team work between the infantry, engineers, and tanks. None of the tanks were destroyed." (5)
"E Company was walking around the tanks and about 4 men were riding the tanks. We met 'jerries' in log bunkers * * * Each bunker had at least one automatic weapon and small arms. The tanks exchanged a few shots with 'jerries' in log bunkers and easily persuaded them to give up." (6)
The push of the 2nd Battalion improved the regiment's position which was now on or around the west side of HÜRTGEN. Meanwhile CCR had launched an attack at 0730 and again at 1630 through the 3rd Battalion of the 121st up the GERMETER-HÜRTGEN ROAD but made no advances. (See Chapter VII) The plan for the taking of HÜRTGEN by CCR of the 5th Armored was abandoned and the mission fell to the infantrymen of the 121st Regiment. Operations for 26 November came as somewhat of a 'breather' with only limited objective attacks being made to straighten out the regimental front line by eliminating small pockets of resistance. Reducing this resistance, the 121st consolidated along the edge of the forest on the southwest, west and northwest sides of the HÜRTGEN clearing. Co. F advanced to within 300 yards of HÜRTGEN but withdrew in the face of heavy fire. A coordinated attack on HÜRTGEN by the regiment with its attachments was planned in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 13th Regiment, on the north. The employment of the tank battalion was not contemplated until the fall of HÜRTGEN in order that the restricted road net would not be blocked for tank destroyers and necessary light vehicles of the regiment.
On the following day the 1st battalion, 13th Regiment, made an advance of approximately 1500 yards to the east on the north side of HÜRTGEN and cut the HÜRTGEN-KLEINHAU road. The 1st battalion of the 121st Regiment advanced toward HÜRTGEN but made little gain because of reduced strength and the heavy fire encountered. The 2nd battalion also attacked toward the town but was stopped cold by small arms fire from the outlying houses and by mortar fire. The 1st and 2nd platoons of Company A were in support of the 2nd battalion, but were of no major assistance. The 3rd battalion on the south continued to attack east through the forest. On the night of 27 November patrols from the 2nd battalion and from the 1st battalion of the 13th Regiment erroneously reported HÜRTGEN unoccupied; the town was nearly encircled by the Americans.
Next morning the 2nd battalion of the 121st attempted to enter HÜRTGEN from the southwest but was surprised to meet resistance. The 1st battalion attacked from the woods to the south of HÜRTGEN but was stopped by machine gun fire coming from the town. The regimental attack bogged down but by noon was reorganized into a combined infantry-armor assault which advanced into HÜRTGEN despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. The 1st platoon Company A, 709th, led the attack, followed by infantrymen from Company E and a squad of the 12th Engineers with minesweepers mounted the tanks of the leading wave. Companies F and G advanced on foot. As the combined arms team approached the town one tank was hit by artillery fire which wounded all of the infantrymen aboard. Small arms fire was received and the troops of F and G companies dropped behind. When the tanks reached the outlying buildings of the town the infantry and engineers dismounted and took shelter on both sides of the street. No mines were encountered in the town so the engineers fought as infantry. The foot troops advanced house by house on both sides of the street while the tanks moved ahead firing into each building with their 75's after which the infantry cleared it top to bottom. Ninety-five percent of the prisoners were taken from reinforced concrete cellars. "The Germans were terrified by the tank fire more than anything else." (7) As the lead tank neared the church in the center of HÜRTGEN it was hit by a bazooka and set on fire. A few minutes later a tank destroyer was knocked out by a bazooka in the same vicinity, however, by 1730 the town was secured after all houses had been cleared. Officers of the 709th Tank Battalion felt that the infantry should have advanced at least three houses ahead of the tanks in the town fighting to prevent tank losses from enemy bazooka fire.
The ruined town of HÜRTGEN
Company C, 13th Regiment advanced into HÜRTGEN from the 1st Battalion positions on the northeast of the town, where, during the day, it had repulsed several counterattacks. The remainder of the 1st Battalion seized HILL 401, south of KLEINHAU. The 1st Battalion of the 121st Regiment joined the 2nd Battalion in mopping up. CCR, 5th Armored Division was alerted and ordered to jump off at daylight 29 November to capture KLEINHAU and the high ground to the northeast.
