CHAPTER V
Summary
During the period from l6 November to 12 December 1944, the 70th Tank Battalion fought in twenty-four active engagements. They were on or within a few hundred yards of the front at all times. Throughout the fighting, tanks were canalized to trails and fire-breaks which were heavily mined and covered by fire. Many times wire and anti-personnel mines held up the infantry, and the tanks provided the only means of neutralizing these obstacles. They tore up the wire by firing into it or moved ahead of the infantry neutralizing AP mines and enabling the infantry to follow.
The capture of GROSSHAU had proved a most difficult and costly engagement for the tanks. In the initial attack six tanks of Company C of the 70th were destroyed and two destroyers from the 803rd were lost. The TDs were employed as tanks during this action. In the later attack, which was successful, the destroyers and tanks were formed into a task force. At this time only six tanks and seven TDs remained of the two companies which had entered the HURTGEN at 100% strength, and in the attack two more were lost.
On 2 December the enemy hurled a counterattack against the line northeast of GROSSHAU. The tanks which were in assembly 300 yards from the front sped forward to intercept the attackers. Before the tanks were aware that they were not among friendly infantry, one tank was destroyed and another damaged by bazooka fire. The next thirty minutes were a wild melee in which crewmen shot many of the enemy with carbines and pistols and drove them away from the tanks. Eventually the counterattack was halted and the tanks assisted the friendly infantry in the complete destruction of the attacking force.
The battalion commander of the 803rd, Lt Col Charles W. Goodwin had this to say about the employment of TDs in the HURTGEN:
"The policy of attaching destroyers to infantry commanders has again proven very unsatisfactory. Lower infantry commanders have no knowledge of the proper use of tank destroyers. In one action during this period our destroyers were ordered to charge a town abreast with tanks, resulting in two destroyers being destroyed. This, in my opinion, was drastic misuse of valuable men and equipment. Sacrifice is a poor substitute for leadership. It is my recommendation that tank destroyers be left under control of the trained and experienced tank destroyer officers. The job in the past and in the future is better done under these conditions."
The 70th Tank Battalion losses in equipment were high and included 24 tanks lost as a result of enemy action. Of these, twelve which did not burn were later retrieved and either repaired or cannibalized for parts.
Personnel casualties included one officer killed and eleven wounded while 11 enlisted men were killed and 67 wounded. During this period there were 46 non-battle casualties from various causes.
The action of the 70th in the HURTGEN FOREST has indicated that it is a terrific expense from the standpoint of materiel for tanks to fight in wooded areas. This is due to the restricted maneuver space available and the vulnerability to concealed anti-tank weapons. However, many times the tanks offered the only means of enabling the infantry to advance. From a morale standpoint it is desirable to have a limited number of tanks supporting infantry as they advance through wooded areas. The psychological effect on ground troops as well as material assistance given makes up for all the handicaps tanks suffer in woods. If at all possible, and if a few trails and open spaces are available for movement of tanks, they should in the future be utilized in platoon size units in attacks through woods.
