CHAPTER III
Conclusions
The 707th Tank Battalion permanently lost 31 medium tanks in the HURTGEN FOREST; 15 from Company A, 7 from Company B, and 9 from Company C. Most of these were due to mines or enemy shell fire. On the night of 8-9 November the battalion reached its lowest ebb with only nine effective medium tanks remaining. Company D, the light tank company, was not committed. In view of the vehicular losses the personnel casualties among the tankers seem rather light. The missing men of Company A doubtless included some dead and wounded, however, aside from these only three men were known to be definitely killed, and one officer and six men wounded. Exact figures for Company B are not available but after action reports indicate that they were rather light. Company C had two killed (including the commanding officer), one man missing in action, and one officer and eleven men wounded.
From the standpoint of combat effectiveness the above figures of tank casualties are important as is the fact that during the action many tanks were immobilized by thrown tracks or soft ground. Since under the prevailing conditions there was no way of rapidly returning these tanks to action, they were just as ineffective as if they had been completely demolished. At no time during the action at VOSSENACK, at KOMMERSCHEIDT, and particularly at SCHMIDT did the infantry have the tank support to which it was entitled.
The 707th Tank Battalion was employed entirely in support of infantry, either offensively or defensively, but never in a separate armored action. Neither the battalion nor its companies were at any time employed in mass against a given objective. Admittedly, this was precluded by the terrain to a large degree rather than by tactical decision.
In the light of present doctrine and with the advantage of hind-sight, it appears that the tanks in support of the VOSSENACK defense could have been better employed as a counterattacking force and used only when it was necessary to repel a German attack. As they were actually used, they merely drew fire which they could not accurately return and were of no material value to the infantry, except possibly for morale considerations.
Again with the advantage of hindsight it appears that early efforts to clear the road between VOSSENACK and KOMMERSCHEIDT of mines, to improve it with engineer work, and to hold it strongly would have paid immeasurable dividends to the 28th Infantry Division.
It is apparent that the job of the tank battalion commander attached to an infantry division is especially difficult. Although he can recommend the employment of his tanks, his recommendations frequently may be rejected. He usually finds his companies and platoons widely separated and can no longer effectively command his units. He must content himself with keeping contact with them and with higher headquarters, trying to see that his companies are supported logistically, and trying always to be in the position where he is needed most. In many instances he is reduced to acting as a relay station between his units and the supported infantry or as a mere dispatcher.
In the European war many separate tank battalions made a distinction between whether they were attached to infantry units or in direct support, feeling that the latter allowed them more independence. Whatever justification may exist for this feeling, the only practical effect at company level is to weaken coordination. The new organization which finds the tank company organic to the regiment and the tank battalion organic to the infantry division should eliminate this problem.
The conclusions drawn are based on fighting in an area characterized by thick woods, deep ravines, and poor roads and complicated by rain, mist, and snow. Although the tank fighting in VOSSENACK was not in the forest, the presence of the surrounding woods determined the nature of the action. The forest limited visibility and maneuver, provided cover for the enemy AT weapons, and found the tanks in exposed positions to their great disadvantage. In the action at KOMMERSCHEIDT affected by the difficulties in clearing the MSR, woods and terrain decidedly influenced the outcome.
To say that tanks should not have been employed at all in the operations of the 28th Division would be an improper conclusion for time and again their work was effective against the enemy and assisted the supported infantry. Rather, it is to be concluded:
- Tanks should not occupy defensive positions in clear view from dominating terrain.
- Adequate routes for movement, supply, and evacuation must be provided for tanks.
- The inclusion of tanks in the infantry division and regiment is mandatory for effective command and communication.
- Armor support was of material value to the 28th Infantry Division.
The 28th Infantry Division succeeded in getting elements south of the KALL RIVER to KOMMERSCHEIDT and SCHMIDT in its attempt to seize the ROER RIVER DAMS. Because the 707th Tank Battalion could not get sufficient armored support forward over the inadequate route from VOSSENACK TO KOMMERSCHEIDT, the forces south of the KALL RIVER could not hold their gains, and were driven back across the river. On 14 November, the 8th Infantry Division in VIII Corps' zone to the south began a mutual exchange of zones with the 28th Division, which was completed on 19 November. (For action of 8th Infantry Division see Chapter VI). Meanwhile, however, the VII Corps opened its major offensive to break out of the northern edge of the HURTGEN FOREST and seize crossings of the ROER in the vicinity of DÜREN.
