CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Of the campaigns and battles which led to "Victory in Europe", one of the most bitter and bloody was the battle of the HURTGEN FOREST. Although this battle was predominantly an infantry action, a separate tank battalion supported each infantry division and the 5th Armored Division played a decisive role. The objective of this study is to examine the manner in which armored units were employed and to evaluate their contribution to the Allied effort in the HURTGEN FOREST. Before bringing these units under close scrutiny it is first desirable to discuss the background of the operation.
The HURTGEN FOREST covers an area of approximately fifty square miles of GERMANY near the BELGIAN border and within the triangle formed by the cities of AACHEN (K840430), DÜREN (F120460), and MONSCHAU (K940185). "Tall, closely packed fir trees rise seventy-five to one hundred feet above the damp, rugged floor of the forest allowing little sunlight to filter through even on the brightest days."(1) The forest is dotted with hills and cut by deep draws which are effective natural obstacles. The weather which the Americans encountered during the battle was unusually severe rain turned the ground into a sea of mud; mist hindered visibility; and snow and bitter cold followed. "Not in years had European Weather been so unfavorable for grand scale military operations." (2)
Why was it necessary for the Allies to fight over this formidable terrain? The battle for the HURTGEN was primarily a battle for the ROER dams. The ROER RIVER was controlled by a series of headwater dams in the hills east of EUPEN (K798272) and in AACHEN the Americans had captured very complete engineering studies showing just what could be done with them. (3)
In the event that the Allied forces north of the HURTGEN FOREST area succeeded in crossing the ROER it would be a simple matter for the Germans, choosing their time, to produce a flood which could effectively cut off these forces.
During the planning stages of the Allied offensive to be launched in the direction of the COLOGNE PLAIN, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, wrote to General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army:
He (the enemy) is assisted in that area ... by the flooded, condition of the ROER RIVER and the capability he has of producing a sudden rush of water by blowing the dams near SCHMIDT (F063298). Bradley has about come to the conclusion that we must take that area, by a very difficult attack from the west and southwest. (4)
And again, in writing after the war, General Eisenhower stated:
We first attempted destruction of the dams by air. The bombing against them was accurate and direct hits were secured; however, the concrete structures were so massive that damage was negligible and there was no recourse except to take them by ground attack. (5)
General Marshall in his Second Biennial Report states:
"The seizure of the ROER RIVER dams in the vicinity of SCHMIDT was a necessary prelude to clearing the enemy from the west bank of the RHINE and a full scale drive into the heart of GERMANY."(6)
Two major penetrations of the SIEGFRIED LINE had been made in the vicinity of AACHEN and U.S. Troops in large numbers were east of AACHEN. By the end of September 1944, although AACHEN itself was still under assault, troops of the First U.S. Army, spearheaded by the 9th Infantry Division, pushed east and south-east of that city and occupied a salient within six miles of the ROER dams. This did not mean that no more fortifications were to be met for another band of defense lines ran through the HURTGEN and MONSCHAU FORESTS, taking full advantage of the terrain. This band was as much as nine to twelve miles deep and included many heavily fortified villages which served as key strongpoints.
In spite of the terrain, the fortifications, and the threat of bad winter weather. General Omar Bradley, Twelfth Army Group Commander, felt (and SHAEF agreed) that both the HURTGEN FOREST area and the ROER RIVER dams must be secured. This mission fell to the First United States Army.
On 21 October Twelfth Army Group ordered a general attack to the east which directed First Army to reach the RHINE in the vicinity of BONN (F547375) and COLOGNE (F450600), and to seize a bridgehead. First Army at this time had assigned to it a front of approximately sixty miles and had under its command three corps: VII Corps on the north, V Corps in the center, and VIII Corps in the south. The majority of the HURTGEN FOREST fighting occurred in the zones of V and VII Corps, then commanded by Major General Leonard T. Gerow and Major General J. Lawton Collins, respectively.
As a preliminary to its attack First Army had to replace the 9th Infantry Division in the line. This division had suffered numerous casualties after six weeks of fighting in the HURTGEN and ROTGEN FORESTS and was badly in need of a period in which to refit and recuperate. Its relief was effected on 28 October by the 28th Infantry Division and with this change the First Army order of battle was as shown in Figure 1.
Facing the First Army at this time from north to south were the LXXXI, IXXIV, IXVI, and IXXX German Corps (Appendix III). This alignment included all of the Seventh German Army with the exception of its northernmost corps, 12 SS Panzer. Elements of this corps, however, were used later in the HURTGEN FOREST campaign. In addition to holding sectors, all of these German units were attempting to refit and reorganize following the withdrawal across FRANCE.
The First Army attack order provided for V Corps to secure the area VOSSENACK (F038327) - SCHMIDT-STRAUCH (F011262), which dominated the ROER RIVER, crossings and provided access to the ROER RIVER dams. Seizure of this area was to be followed by a coordinated attack by VII Corps through the northern HURTGEN FOREST defenses to reach the RHINE in the vicinity of COLOGNE. The preliminary (V Corps) phase proved to be harder than had been expected and VII Corps was committed while V Corps still fought for its objective.
The Germans were now fighting on their own soil and close to their sources of supply; their reconstituted Seventh and First Armies were in sufficient strength, and were handled, Allied officers felt, more skillfully than they had been in NORMANDY... The Germans appeared to have strong local reserves available as they had not in NORMANDY, and they used them expertly and economically, thrusting in short, sharp counterattacks against dangerous Allied penetrations, then promptly withdrawing. (7)
Because the hilly terrain and the dense forest limited observation, supporting artillery was unable to render continuous or effective assistance to the advance and the American soldier was forced to fight without the close support to which he was accustomed. Except for a few days bad weather prevented planes from giving close support to the attacking troops. Finally, the weather and the terrain combined-to reduce the effectiveness of armor.
