by the 47th Infantry Regiment (9th Inf. Div.)
13 Sept - 26 Oct 1944
Just at dark, about 40 or 50 Germans counter-attacked In the 2nd Battalion's sector from the vicinity of WEISENBERG. The 81mm mortars fired 700 rounds in addition to the artillery fire and the enemy withdrew. About 2300, an enemy patrol of 30 men moved SW from (990415). A 2nd Battalion patrol allowed the point, consisting of 4 men, to pass, then killed them with hand grenades thrown by Sgt Walter Ruark. Pvt. 1cl Clayton Harrison opened fire on the remainder with a BAR, causing numerous casualties. The next morning, the equipment of 10 men was found in the area.
During the early morning hours of 13 September, the 2nd Battalion Commander reported the Battalion in critical circumstances because of enemy infiltration and heavy artillery concentrations, when in reality, (according to the company officers interviewed) the situation was quite secure. The Regimental Commander instructed the Battalion to withdraw to an area in the woods S of KREWINKEL, which was accomplished before daylight. The following day the Battalion commander was relieved and the 1st Battalion Executive Officer, Captain Allgood, assumed command.
Throughout 17 September, the enemy artillery had been very active and fired heavy concentrations into KREWINKEL, causing 37 casualties. Our own 81mm mortars fired 2000 rounds, the 84th PA Battalion, 2800 rounds and Cannon Company, with the two 105 Self-propelled guns attached from the 746th Tank Battalion, 1084 rounds. Cannon Company had an observer in KREWINKEL and reported excellent results. The fire of the 81mm: mortars was limited by the rationing of ammunition.
On 18 September, the 3rd Battalion was deployed around SCHEVENHÜTTE as shown in overlay *, with Co. "K" in the woods N of the road leading to GRESSENICH and one platoon of Co. "I" set up at (003423) to block the road. (* Overlay was not included with this document. Scorpio)
At 0400, about 90 enemy infantrymen, armed with flame throwers, bazookas, concussion and fragmentation grenades and automatic weapons, counter-attacked SE on the road from GRESSENICH. They succeeded in penetrating beyond the road block but were then stopped by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. A 76mm gun on a tank fired into their midst at point-blank range, causing extreme casualties. The commander of Company "K", 1st Lt. W. L. McWaters, stated that he doubted if more than 15 or 20 men from the attacking force survived, a belief that was strengthened by information gotten from a PW the following day. The situation was cleared up before daylight, with our total casualties amounting to two men wounded.
At about 0530 on this day, Co. "A" observed a company of enemy infantry moving NE along the road to their front. Desiring to keep their positions secret, the company did not open fire on them. Several hours later, a 12-man enemy patrol entered the Battalion area between companies "A" and "B". Six of them were killed, five taken prisoner and the remaining one escaped. In the afternoon, five men, one of them bearing a Red Cross flag, entered the area and were captured. One protested violently that the flag gave them immunity from capture, but another agreed that, since they had seen our positions, they should not be allowed to return. Shortly afterward, the enemy began shelling the edge of the woods.
On 22 September, the enemy launched his all-out effort to regain that portion of the Siegfried defenses which we had occupied. The attack was aimed at the 3rd Battalion around SCHEVENHÜTTE and was preceded by small diversionary attacks followed by the most terrific artillery barrage the Battalion had ever experienced. It was subsequently learned from PW interrogation that the enemy artillery consisted of two 150mm howitzers, one battalion of nine 105mm howitzers, five 3-gun batteries of 150mm howitzers, several 210mm pieces available on call, and, in addition, 120mm and 80mm mortars.
At 0530, a small attack, consisting of small arms only, was made from the N in the vicinity of (006424) and, fifteen minutes later, another was launched at (009424), both of which were designed to draw the attention of the Battalion to the north. At 0555, the extremely heavy artillery concentrations began to fall, first on the positions occupied by Co. "L" and then rolling steadily backward to the Battalion CP area at RJ (007417). The barrage lasted Tor fifteen minutes, destroying all wire communications and putting a number of radios out of commission, which resulted in the Battalion having to depend for some time on the very hazardous system of messengers for communication.
The attack began at 0610, the main effort being made from the E by two companies advancing abreast, one of which, the 6th Company, 48th Regiment, penetrated into the area occupied by Co."L", forcing the right platoon to withdraw.
The 3rd Platoon in the center, had no knowledge of the withdrawal of the 1st platoon on the right until S/Sgt. Wm. D. Clark of the right squad reported the enemy breakthrough to T/Sgt. Wm. J. De Grasse, acting 3rd platoon leader. Sgt. Clark then returned to his position on the right flank and "personally held the attack for about 10 minutes with rifle fire alone". Although wounded in both legs by grenade fragments, he continued firing and did not receive medical aid until the attack was repulsed. The enemy was not more than ten yards from him most of the time.
Sgt. De Grasse had only two squads in his platoon, and leaving the BARs to protect the left flank, the rest of the men fought off the enemy with rifles and hand grenades, at the same time moving gradually to the right. They killed between 35 and 40 enemy in front of their positions and successfully pinned down the rest.
Sgt. De Grasse captured six prisoners, one of whom attempted to draw his pistol and was instantly killed by the Sergeant. He then sent two riflemen out, covering them with the fire of four others, and they returned with 31 prisoners.
The 81mm mortars had 60 rounds per gun ready with pins pulled and increments prepared, but laid on the FPL to the N. They were still getting mortar fire when the attack started. S/Sgt Martin (wounded with 4 machine gun bullets in his shoulder) contacted the mortars and advised them of the direction of attack. Lt. Silliman and S/Sgt John F. Westley each manned a gun, turning them to the E and started dropping them in the 3rd platoon area. In the meantime, the enemy had set up several (Sgt. Westley said 15) machine guns sited on a stretch of road to the front and including the mortar positions. Lt. Silliman was wounded but continued to fire until he passed out, after which his gun, too, was knocked out. Sgt. Westley fired the 60 rounds at his gun and then went to the ammunition dump (see sketch) for more. Finally realizing how hot it was, he went toward the enemy and fired a few rounds from a .45 pistol. By this time, the mortar crews were also spraying the hedgerows with carbines and pistols. The Sergeant then fired into the hedgerow with a sub-machine gun and the enemy scattered* S/Sgt Porosky (then Pfc) dropped a round in the mortar with one hand and, at the same time, shot a German climbing over the fence into his position with the other.
Acting Sgt. Chilich, from his position on the left, kept firing into the right flank of the enemy, picking off 10, thus preventing them from getting into our machine gun position.
Sgt. Robert D. Moses and Sgt. Warren M. Wahlgreen had gone to the ammunition dump for more machine gun ammunition, and the former saw Lt. Silliman lying on the ground. He approached him, but just as he got to the Lieutenant, the enemy opened machine gun fire on him and killed him. Sgt. Wahlgreen took 4 boxes of ammunition back to the machine guns and moved one of them into the corner of the field (see sketch ) from which position he, fired into the hedgerow.
Pvt. Harlow H. Emerson had a .50 cal. machine gun from a jeep in position South of the draw where the main action took place. Just at the "break of dawn" he fired a box of ammunition into the enemy killing 3. About 15 minutes later the enemy opened fire with a machine gun and Emerson fired on thorn, killing the crew. The enemy had captured one doughboy, but released him when the .50 cal. opened up. At about 0645 -0700, one platoon of "I" Co., the only reserve force available, located at (004415), attacked NE across the valley, re storing "L" Co.'s positions.
At the same time this attack was progressing, another company, the 7th Company, 48th Regiment (German), made a wide flanking movement to the S. A PW stated they had marched 8 kilometers during the night to get there. The engineer platoon and the howitzers of the Cannon Company were on the exposed flank. The latter had been there for 6 days and were placed there due to the problem of communications, and because it was the only available firing position because of the trees.
Enemy machine guns opened up less than 100 yards E of them, catching them completely by surprise, and the crews were unable to get to the guns, but instead joined the fire fight as infantrymen. Their positions were over-run but the guns were not damaged or lost, breech blocks having been previously removed.
As the enemy turned N into SCHEVENHÜTTE they were slaughtered by the machine guns of the Engineer platoon and Cannon Co., plus rifle fire. At this point they were disorganized and dispersed. Some moved W of the road and headed N through the woods where they contacted the kitchen force of the Battalion, becoming further disorganized. The A & P platoon and the CP personnel joined the fight and killed a few. One section of tanks and TDs were used as a mobile striking force and moved up and down the main street, firing machine guns and 76s at any enemy who put in an appearance.
By 0900 the attack had been repulsed, the Battalion suffering 13 killed and 34 wounded. They evacuated 34 enemy wounded, 45 PW's and over 150 killed, 86 enemy dead being removed from the Battalion's position. It was impossible to determine the exact number of enemy dead, as only the bodies in the Battalion position were picked up, and many more were known to be killed by our mortar fire.
