Wugi's NewsThink Tits (sorry) and bits from news group talk. Guido "Wugi" Wuyts @ Dilbeek, Belgium, Europe, World, Solar System, Milky Way, Local Cluster, ... |
> > History shows
that: > That is not true. > > Science
considered moving faster than acoustic waves would be
impossible for mankind... > That is not true. > > Science
considered moving faster than light would be
impossible for any matter... > Please, you will have to try harder than that. OK, let's have a try. If you visualise the world
line of a faster than light particle in a Minkowsky
diagram you will notice I myself like to picture mass
as a nest of light clocks, i.e. a web of radiation that
goes to and fro within There are some snags however.
Firstly, as you leave a one-dimensional
space-description for a two- or three- Secondly, there is the
phenomenon of phase correlation, that would apply to any
pair of e.g. photons having Faster
than light, and space expansion? Could somebody enlighten me in general terms on the following questions I have been brooding about. 1.
How do they explain the possibility of ultraluminal
(more than light speed) recession speed between remote
> The light-speed
restriction in relativity merely requires that one 2.
Couldn't it be that light speed precisely mirrors the
(local) space expansion rate, so that matter is doomed
to > I don't understand this question. 3.
How does one explain that space expansion has to occur
between galaxies, but obviously is not doing so > 3.1. Because space is
only expanding _on the average_. On the average, the >> 3.2. I suggested in
a recent posting to this newgroup that one can picture
the This balloon model describes
the "matter dominated closed universe Friedmann Small bodies like people and
skyscrapers are held together by electrical Gravity IS the dominant force
even at galactic scales, so it's a little trickier However, not that it is best
to think of the expansion of the universe as occuring (Your first two questions
were too imprecisely formulated for me to understand > I have two quick
questions. Talking about relativistic
mass, it may be awarding to realise that the difference
between rest mass and moving My favourite example is light
clocks, ie photons going to and fro. Photons have no
rest mass, yet they do have I have come myself, in fact,
to view all manifestation of matter as a feature of
light clock colonies, and mass as Time
dilatation and twin paradox. > Before I begin I
would like to explain that I am actually a biology
major, According to relativity
if two people on different ships (we'll call them Another theory, I believe
it is special relativity, indicates that if a So in the case of the two
rockets moving away from eachother, who is I hope I am making my
confusion clear. I would guess that there is just 1. (Me) Your relativity problem can be solved by disentangling the two separate paradoxes it entails. It is not the place here to detail fully the theory, "relatively" simple though it is. Only special relativity is involved anyway. The first paradox is: how can two observers in motion among each other, observe each other's time lagging behind "at the same time"? But you can picture the result by visualising a pair of scissors. Consider that the end points of both cutting edges represent two world points of the first observer, and that the two fingergrip ends represent likewise two world points of the second observer. If you hold the scissors a little open along a horizontal line in front of your eyes, we will assume that both lower points (cutting and fingergrip) represent a clock tick for each observer, say "one second". Then the legs will link each observer's clock event with another event noted by the other observer, which represents the "lag" of the other one's clock with respect to "his own clock". The situation is symmetrical, as both legs of the scissors link a lower, say previous, point from observer 1, with a higher, say later, point of observer 2. In fact, the scissor legs represent space axes, or lines of simultaneity, of each observer (the one whose "1 second" point lays on the leg). Whilst the cutting and, otherwise, the fingergrip points represent world lines, or time axes, of both observers. Once you get the picture you realise how two observers can see each other's time system lag behind "simultaneously". Now for the second paradox, which is the so-called twin paradox. The difference here is that the situation is no longer symmetrical! The observer staying on earth, means that he never leaves his (supposedly inertial) frame of reference. The travelling partner, however, at least has to switch between two inertial frames of reference: a parting one and a returning one. Around the turning point his perception of the world changes abruptly, as his time axis suddenly tilts from a position where it used to point towards his partner's past, to a new one pointing towards his partner's future. If the change is abrupt (without deceleration and acceleration processes which are even trickier as they leave the framework of special relativity...), a whole episode of the partner's lifetime is "lost" in the time system of the traveller. As he returns home he finds his partner older by the amount of time "lost" in the description by his own framework.
2. (> third party) I think
this question is best handled by responding to two First, how is it that two
people can each Then second, if each can see
the other ticking slower, how is it decided The person on the ship cannot
say he *remained* stationary. Because The second half of http://sheol.org/throopw/sr-ticks-n-bricks.html By the way, if you see a way
to improve or simplify the presentation In general, the comparison of
SR to simple plane geometry is an Galaxy
time and universal time; time dilatation and
expansion rate. > Can someone answer
the following as it has been puzzeling me for quite (no input of mine. Just interested) >> It all depends on
how you think of it. The simple cosmological model
you have in mind is no doubt the matter The point is that each galaxy observes the same effects as any other galaxy. It is impossible to
overestimate the extreme idealization of the Friedmann > Now, as the big bang
theory suggests there must come a time when this >> In all of the
Friedmann models, the expansion is continuously slowing.
The "closed" model can be
visualized as a football (the circles of latitude But again, re Klaus Kassner's
recent post, the 3 dimensional euclidean space > Does this mean there
is an infinite increase in the rate of time flow, If
time dilates with >> You are confused.
During the expansion phase, each galaxy observes light Distances
and age of the universe. > I read recently that
scientists have discovered a galaxy(ies) as far away >> In cosmology, there
are several different types of distances, the > If nothing travels
faster than >> The speed of light
is an upper limit in the Minkowski space of special A good introduction to both
of these issues (and many more interesting Edward R. Harrison:
COSMOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSE If you read only one book about cosmology, this should be it. At a slightly more technical
level, a couple of colleagues and I have 1) gather together, in one
place and with a uniform, understandable and nice
notation, all 2) present an efficient
numerical method (and publicly Both goals also consider the
effect of inhomogeneity on distances. Although it is a
good Our paper appeared in
Astronomy and Astrophysics Vol. 318, No. 3, pages > The European Commission
has just announced an agreement whereby In the first year 's'
will replace the soft 'c'. Sertainly, this In the 3rd year, publik
akseptanse of the new spelling kan be ZE DREM VIL FINALI KUM TRU!! Very funny indeed. Still, it
is also possible to consider seriously the possibility Inglish saampls. Dhe cheif difranses bitwein Eithieupian and Reuman Caetholic Churches. Dhe Jhezueits thoaht dhaet
sym elimants ov Eithieupian Cristiaeniti caim from dhe Drugs. Apart from dheiz
scyiantificalli efectiv poizns, hwich dhei pripear
eupnli widhaut Jheivs. It'z rymi hau sleiping on a
thing oftn maikz jou feil qwyit difrant abaut it. It'z I have this problem with the
distinction between countable-noncountable infinities. 1. it just is a the result of a particular way of ordering a set, albeit a happy one, amidst a sea of less such happy ways; 2. it postpones the enumeration of elements with ever more complicated description, ever more ahead (and in the end scrambles the border of distinction with related domains of noncountable elements). The set of natural numbers is the basic model, as a matter of fact the criterion for comparison of countable sets. However, it takes a minimal mix-up to transform them in kind of an unoverseeable, uncountable desert. Take as a rule of enumeration: first the evens, then the odds. The "then" implies a never ending enumeration that has to precede a next one. The rational numbers are proven countable thanks to a cunning way of diagonal counting. But taken in the natural order, any "finitely describable" number has no such neighbour, so there is no enumeration in finite terms along this order. In the case of natural and rational numbers we don't worry about that, since we know some ways "that work". But what with establishing a supposedly countable set of theorems as Gödel would like? Let us try a "clever" way of ordering theorems, by grouping for instance theorems that would, given a number A, perform an operation with A+n. Each number n (natural or, worse, real) would determine a theorem Tn. In doing so, we obtain a series T0, T1, T2, ... , Tn, ... from which there is no escape before being allowed to continue the enumeration with theorems of a "next" type. OK then, let's try a "dumb" method. We accept all ASCII codes, ordered in a definable way and then proceed by eliminating the ones which do not represent theorems. First, how definable may that ordering be, eg how long may the lines become, and how many...? Second, we now have to establish whether a code is a theorem, which seems to counter our intention to produce theorems mechanically. Well, at least we can establish whether it respects syntax. My point is that this way we will doubtlessly stumble upon endless subsets of meaningless code before encountering a "next" code-with-a-theorem. My argument leads to the assertion that there is no such thing as a well-ordered set of theorems, supposedly representing the human mind about some theory, and out of which Gödel would then playfully pick a non-provable theorem to prove incompleteness. The end result of his statement remains the same of course, but it is looked upon in another way. The noncountability of real numbers raises its own problems. The "power of infinity" (I don't know the proper English term) of R defined as a set of all decimals, or of R defined as a straight line in algbraic geometry, is fundamentally arbitrary, in that you make it as great or as small as you wish to, and moreover both representations of R are mutually independent. The power of the "real", physical line in space is what it is, probably unprobable, and independent of our mathematical representations of R (however neatly they seem to settle down on it). My last problem is with limits, one of the tricks to approach the reals. If we state eg, that the limit of a series 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, ..., 1/n, ... equals zero, then I say to myself, no, it is at best a nest of real numbers that couldn't be disentangled, as crowded as you like, and amongst which zero is the only member describable in finite terms. Discussions: 1. > (it postpones
the enumeration of elements with ever more complicated
description, ever more ahead) >> (My reply) But any "successful" enumeration has to push ahead in its tasklist the elements whose description becomes increasingly complex, eg the rationals that become too "real"-like, the elements bordering the non-rational domain... >>> (I) The zig-zag through m/n's ? The higher the m, n the later you get there; why is that a problem? If every x in A shows up as an f(k), f is an enumeration of A; if not, it isn't. There aren't any shades of grey in between! (Maybe you have in mind an example where it is not easy to tell -- but it still is a yes or no issue). > >The set of natural numbers is the basic model, as a matter of fact the criterion for comparison of countable sets. However, it takes a minimal mix-up to transform them in kind of an unoverseeable, uncountable... >>> Hey... you said the "U" word again... >> ... desert. Take as a rule of enumeration: first the evens, then the odds. The "then" implies a never ending enumeration that has to precede a next one. >>> One mentally goes over the first part, then the next... -- like you just did; you didn't stumble or get confused either. >>>> But you cannot mechanize this letting your program "mentally" jump over those tasks... >>>>> There are highly complicated wellorderings of w ( = {0, 1, ...} ). Of course if you _know_ X is a w.o. of w then you know it is countable without performing any tasks to "read" it! If not, then sure, it may take some effort to recognize what it is. "Mechanize" is a separate matter, though. If you only use computable functions on w, you can recognize/describe some of the w.o.'s of w, but not all; countable w.o.'s beyond a certain level of complexity are out of reach. Here we have strayed off cardinality, and gotten to ordinals... and effectiveness. > (Well, at least we
can establish whether it respects syntax. My point is
that this way we will doubtlessly stumble upon endless
subsets of meaningless code before encountering a
"next" code-with-a-theorem.) >> Double-clever way. Still remains, how to order the theorems according to their operations... >>> You don't really
_need_ dovetailing for that; you have an algorithm that
produces any theorem at some finite time... so as they
come up you classify them. You cannot do better; no
algorithm can tell you whether an arbitrary formula is
or isn't a theorem. > It might be centuries before the first one shows up; the search never ends; but every proof+theorem will appear at some finite time. >> When I said "endless" I meant infinite of the kind "all the evens", and without a mechanical way of jumping out of this routine... >>> Dovetailing does show you don't have to be stuck. There may be infinitely many tasks t1, t2, ... to perform; carry out 1 step of t1, then 1 of t1 and 1 of t2, then 1 of t1, 1 of t2, 1 of t3... > The reals, whether defined by decimals (R1), or Dedekind cuts (R2), or Cauchy sequences (R3), or integer sequences (R4)... etc have the exact same cardinality; there is a 1-1 onto mapping between any two R's. >> I can "mentally crowd" my geometrical line with many more dots than needed for R1 or her sisters, or on the contrary think it a bit scarce for them. >>> No doubt, but your line wouldn't then be the reals. > Eh... isn't 1/2, or any 1/n finitely describable?! And 0 is not one of them anyway; it just happens to satisfy the definition of limit. I don't know what you are objecting to. >>>> (a third
party) What he probably means is that the *limit*
of the sequence 1/2, 1/3, ... is a «nest of real numbers
that couldn't be disentangled». The number 0 is the only
number in the «nest» describable in finite terms. >> The original poster
thanks you for almost exactly producing the correction
as he put it in a previous reply, which he/I repeat
hereafter: >>> Not in R; 0 is
the only limit here (all limits in R are unique). You
can build nonstandard models extending R, where every x
in R has a "cloud" around it, x + o, for o in I, the
Infinitesimals. Maybe that is the 'nest'! But you are
not in R then. And there still isn't a "closest neighbor
of 0" ... >> So the limit is the nest, not the series. What I mean is that the "real real" numbers, which are not describable in finite terms, do seem to me neither describable in terms of a series, infinite though it be, of elements with finite description each. >>> Since 0.a1, 0.a1 a2, ... does describe x = 0.a1 a2 a3 ..., you must be thinking of sequences of a's longer than x. >> You could reply, oh well, but take a look at, say, a series defining pi. So what, pi is describable in finite geometrical terms, but not as a decimal number: it is no less a nest... >>> Pi is 2q, 0 < q < 2, 1 - (q^2)/2! + (q^4)/4! - ... = 0 (cos(q) = 0) and its decimal digits can of course be found. >> ... than my "zero" example... My point is that the decisive distinction between (two "nearest") real numbers starts only after the aleph0-th decimal position, that is at the very point where the tentative series comes to an end! >>> Well, there is
no aleph-0 position; aleph-0 means "all a_n, n in N".
But you may consider aleph-0 "plus 1": W = 0.a1 a2 ...;
b1 -- or more b's. What intuition leads you to this? (if
in fact this is what you are saying) >>>> (me
again) The problem which I argued occurs "after"
aleph0, as a matter of fact dooms whilest the decimal
series unrolls: it raises there the question whether two
series like, say: >>>>> (third party) You keep talking about this cloud of real numbers clustering around 0, in spite of the fact that everybody keeps telling you that there simply are no such (real) numbers. What makes you so certain that these numbers exist???? >>>>>> (me) Well, nobody seems to be able to accept the fact that there are, rational as well as irrational, numbers that you can pinpoint by some description (geometric or decimal, or as a converging series...), but that there are (to my taste many more) others that you can't. Even for the rationals, whatever the order of counting down you may invent, some numbers will always hide beyond the "...etcetera" you find yourself at last putting behind your list. And what about the irrationals in their immediate vicinity...? Sentence
structure in languages These are the gatherings I got from a request to forward translations of a (rather compound) sentence into various languages, with a view to comparing differences and subtleties between them. The sentence was first put by me in Dutch, the English word-to-word translation follows in each example. Dutch: German: Problems: Westerlauwer Frisian (Frysk): The man there /('t = clitic marking relative clause)/ I yesterday this book (him-)to given have, asked me for it keep /inf/ to may /"gerund" = infinitive + n/ for it next month to his mother as birthday-present give to be-able-to. (The "gerund" is a sort of second infinitive, used after "te", among others. BTW not a very "idiomatic" way to express this sentence in Frisian, but perfectly grammatical.) Norwegian: (right?) (BTW I know my example is
clumsy but it is in heavy-laden sentences that Spanish: French: The man to hom I had lent
this book yesterday me has asked Tagalog: Yonder man which/that lending
I (I find it extremely difficult to give a word for word translation of the above. Note that in Philippine languages, there are no noun stems distinct from verb stems. Stems are neutral. The neutral stems are marked for usage. Obviously, there are words that I find extremely difficult to translate exactly into English. But I gave my best approximation of the English words for each word used in the above translation (although it may not even make sense because the true meaning of the original Tagalog words are lost entirely in the translation)) (I also know a bit of Chavacano (Creole Spanish spoken in very few places in the Philippines; Zamboanga, Cavite, Ternate). Here goes:) Chavacano: The man which/that
past_marker loan I the book yesterday, past_marker say (This is easier to to
translate word for word into English. Although the
grammar is very Filipino, the words are European which
makes it a lot easier to translate for me into English) |